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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1895 the legislature of the young state of Montana enacted
its first Civil Code. The Code was largely a copy of one drafted by
David Dudley Field for his own state of New York-where the pro-
posal had proved most controversial, for Field advocated nothing
less than the reduction to statutory form of the entire scope of pri-
vate law: contracts, property, torts, agency, and many other sub-
jects. All of these traditionally had been the preserve of the courts
alone.
By enacting the Field Code, Montana adopted a comprehen-
sive statute that had been designed for New York but had been
rejected there, although similar versions had been enacted into law
in the Dakota Territory in 1866 and in California in 1872. Neither
the legislature of Dakota nor that of California had made many
changes in Field's original draft. The same was true in Montana.
Among the portions left untouched was a cluster of eleyen sections
in a Title called "Transfer of Obligations." The last eight of these
sections set forth special rules for "covenants running with the
land."
Nearly a century has passed since Montana became a Field
Code state. Upon the statute books the sections on "covenants
running with the land" still lie undisturbed. Their history in the
courts, however, has been a different matter.
This article reviews the background of those provisions and
their life in the Montana courts. It relates the story of the substan-
tive law as it began, as it developed, as it stands today. That story
includes the theme of a native jurisprudence struggling to free it-
self from a cage of foreign statutes, and it may serve as a homily on
the risks of pre-mature codification.
This article consists of six Parts. Part I is this Introduction.
Part II outlines the common law of running covenants as it -ap-
peared upon the eve of codification. Because the Field Code was,
for the most part, a summary of the then-existing common law,
understanding that law assists one in comprehending the intent
and meaning of the Code provisions we shall consider here. Part
[Vol. 51
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III describes the origin and theory of the Field Civil Code. Part IV
combines information from Parts II and III to arrive at a conclu-
sion as to the "original intent"-the meaning-of the codifiers and
of the legislature that adopted the statutes regulating land cove-
nants. This original intent is, of course, supposed to be binding
upon the Montana state courts.'
Part V is a review of the law of the Montana courts-the judi-
cial development of the subject to the present day. As we shall see,
that judicial development has often been at odds with the intent
behind the statutes.
Finally, Part VI offers some observations on the Montana ju-
risprudence of land covenants; suggests that it be liberated from
the statutes; and predicts, in rough outline, the shape of a new
common law, free of a code designed for New York, and distinctive
to Montana.2
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-102 (1989).
2. Note on Sources.
The law review article most frequently cited in this study is Fisch, The Dakota Civil
Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45 N.D.L. Rev. 9 (1968) [hereinafter
Fisch]. Other articles are cited fully in the succeeding notes.
The treatises, historical works, and book-length essays relied upon are listed below.
Several of the editions cited have been superseded. In my analysis of 19th century law, I
used the available editions published closest to the time under study.
The treatises, historical works, and book-length essays, together with short citation
form, are as follows:
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1944) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY].
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter ALP].
S. AMOS, AN ENGLISH CODE (1873)[hereinafter AMOS].
J. BEHAN, THE USE OF LAND As AFFECTED BY COVENANTS AND OBLIGATIONS NOT IN THE
FORM OF COVENANTS (1924)[hereinafter BEHAN].
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907) [hereinafter CARTER].
C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT'. A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL RE-
FORM (1981)[hereinafter COOK].
R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1984) [hereinaf-
ter CUNNINGHAM].
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1973) [hereinafter DOBBS].
D. FIELD, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (T.
Coan ed. 1890) [hereinafter DDF Works]. Each citation to this book is to a paper or speech
by Field; I have dispensed with identifying the original date, place, and source of each paper
and speech.
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
C. GALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS (9th ed. 1916) [hereinafter GALE].
J. GODDARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS (8th ed. 1921) [hereinafter
GODDARD].
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (0. Holmes ed. 1873) [hereinafter J. KENT].
R. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS (1989) [hereinafter NATELSON,
POA].
J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1892) [hereinafter POMEROY].
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II. THE COMMON LAW AT THE TIME OF CODIFICATION
A. Introduction to the Nineteenth Century Common Law
In the late nineteenth century, burdens upon land included
servitudes created by grant, reservation, or prescription and servi-
tudes created by contract. Those created by grant, reservation, or
prescription were the incorporeal hereditaments, the most impor-
tant of which were easements, rents, and profits.3 Those created by
contract were divided into real covenants and equitable servitudes.
Real covenants were contractual servitudes that qualified for
enforcement by a court of law. Violation of a real covenant was the
basis for a claim for money damages by the promisee or his assigns
against the promisor or his assigns. Equitable servitudes were con-
tracts running with the land in equity. Violation of an equitable
servitude was the basis for a suit in a chancery court for an injunc-
tion against the assigns of the promisor or an equitable lien against
the servient estate. Most real covenants qualified for treatment as
equitable servitudes also. The prerequisites for enforcement in eq-
uity, however, were somewhat different than at law; therefore eq-
uity would enforce some contracts that did not run with the land
at law.
The law of the late 19th century contained all the conditions
necessary for enforcement of another kind of servitude: the contin-
uing equitable lien based not upon contract but upon a theory of
PROGRESSIVE MEN OF THE STATE OF MONTANA (1902) (subscribed biographical compila-
tion) [hereinafter PROGRESSIVE MEN].
1 R. RAYMER, MONTANA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE (1930) (hereinafter RAYMER].
W. RAWLE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TITLE 334-35 (3rd. ed.
1860) [hereinafter RAWLE].
Root, The Courts and Lawyers of Montana in H. SANDERS, A HISTORY OF MONTANA
(1913) [hereinafter Root].
F. C. VON SAVIGNY, THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (A.
Hayward trans. 1831) [hereinafter SAVIGNY].
H. SIMS, A TREATISE ON COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND OTHER THAN COVE-
NANTS FOR TITLE (1901) [hereinafter SIMS].
C. SPENCE, TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA, 1864-89 (1975) [herein-
after SPENCE].
W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930) [hereinafter WALSH].
3. Today, because the practice of creating easements by contract rather than by con-
veyance is so prevalent, it is easy to forget that the practice is technically incorrect. The
distinction between easements (created by grant, reservation, or prescription) and equitable
servitudes (created by contract) was better understood in the days of the codifiers:
[Alt common law an easement can be created only by express or implied grant or
by prescription; the doctrine of [equitable servitudes] has no connection with ei-
ther grant or prescription; it is founded exclusively upon principles of the law of
contract ....
BEHAN, supra note 2, at 45. At the time of the codifiers, when the parties purported to
create an easement by covenant, the covenant was construed as a grant or reservation.
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unjust enrichment. A brief description of the uses of this lien ap-
pears in Section D of this Part II.
B. Real Covenants
Real covenants have a long history in Anglo-American juris-
prudence. At least one case on the subject appears in the English
Year Books of the 14th century," and a decision by the Court of
King's Bench dating from Elizabethan times5 remains the leading
case on the subject.
Most of the real covenants found in the early cases imposed
affirmative obligations upon the servient owner, such as the obliga-
tion to pay rent or improve the land.' By the time of the Montana
codification in 1895, however, English and American courts had
validated numerous other affirmative covenants. Among these were
the title covenants of quiet enjoyment, warranty, and further as-
surances;7 promises to repair, maintain, and turn over in good re-
pair;8 to pay rent, either perpetually or for a term;9 to share the
expenses for maintaining a dam;10 to supply water and other sub-
stances;" to lay out a certain amount of money for repairs in the
event of a fire;" to insure against fire; 3 to erect new structures,
4. Pakenham's Case, Y.B. Hil. 42 Edw. 3, pl. 14 (1368).
5. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
6. For example, in Pakenham's Case, a convent (monastery) was a tenant of the lord
of a manor. As part of the services to be rendered, the prior of the convent promised that its
monks would always sing at religious services at the manor's chapel. The court held that the
lord's successors in interest (i.e., the "heirs and assigns" of the reversioner) could enforce
that promise against the prior and his convent-that, in modern parlance, the "benefit of
the covenant ran with the land."
In Spencer's Case, a tenant for years promised to build a brick wall upon the land. See
also Brewster v. Kitchin, 1 Ld. Raym. 317, 91 Eng. Rep. 1108 (K.B. 1696) (covenant of
"farther assurance").
The right of the heirs of a reversioner to the running of the benefit was established
definitively by statute in 1540. See 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34 (1540).
7. Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Verplanck v. Wright, 23 Wend.
506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 183 (1869); Salmon v. Vallejo, 41
Cal. 481 (1871).
8. Bally v. Wells, Wilm. 339, 97 Eng. Rep. 130, 132 (C.P. 1769); Allen, 3 Denio 284;
Verplanck, 23 Wend. 506; Myers v. Burns, 33 Barb. 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); Martyn v.
Clue, 18 Q.B. 661, 118 Eng. Rep. 249 (1852); Wakefield v. Brown, 9 Q.B. 209, 115 Eng. Rep.
1254 (1846); Demarest v. Willard, 8 Cow. 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
9. E.g., Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N.Y. 558 (1863) (perpetual); Tyler v. Heidorn, 46
Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866) (perpetual); Allen, 3 Denio 284 (term); Verplanck, 23
Wend. 506 (term).
10. Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862).
11. Id. (water); Jourdain v. Wilson, 4 B. & Aid. 266, 106 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1821)
(water). See also Bally, Wilm. 341, 97 Eng. Rep. 130 (wheat straw).
12. Allen, 3 Denio 284.
13. Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Aid. 1, 106 Eng. Rep. 1094 (K.B. 1821); Laffan v. Naglee,
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such as fences;" ' to cultivate the land in a particular manner; 5 to
reside on the servient premises;16 to pay certain charges on behalf
of the lessor, such as taxes1 7 and assessments;18 to afford a party
the pre-emptive right to purchase the land;19 and to pay the as-
sessed value of improvements at the end of a term.20 In addition,
the judiciary had upheld a wide range of restrictive cove-
nants-covenants that imposed no affirmative duties upon the ser-
vient possessor but reduced his freedom of action in some manner.
These covenants included promises to refrain from erecting certain
kinds of structures upon the servient property2' or to erect them
only in compliance with certain specifications; 22 to refrain from
cutting timber;23 and to refrain from carrying out a certain trade
on the premises.2
Although the common law courts proved flexible enough to
recognize a great number of real covenants, their love for form and
their desire to keep the number of land restrictions at a managea-
ble level induced them to impose several prerequisites to legal en-
forcement. First, a real covenant had to be a covenant, i.e., it had
to be contained in a written instrument under seal.25 If the grantor
was the covenantor, the instrument in question could be a deed
poll signed by him. Traditionally, if the grantee was the covenan-
tor, then he would have to sign and seal an indenture, lease, or
other instrument. By the late 19th century, however, some courts
would enforce a covenant by the grantee contained in a deed poll if
the grantee had accepted the deed.26
Before they would enforce a real covenant against the assigns
of a promisor, the common law courts required that the burden of
9 Cal. 663 (1858).
14. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583); Bronson v. Coffin, 108
Mass. 175 (1871); Easter v. Little Miami R.R., 14 Ohio St. 48 (1862).
15. Verplanck, 23 Wend. 506; Martyn, 18 Q.B. 661, 118 Eng. Rep. 249.
16. Verplanck, 23 Wend. 506.
17. Id.; Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 223, 5 P. 104 (1884); Ellis v. Bradbury, 75 Cal.
234, 17 P. 3 (1888).
18. Post v. Kearney, 2 N.Y. 394 (1849).
19. Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 663 (1858).
20. Bailey v. Richardson, 66 Cal. 416, 5 P. 910 (1885).
21. Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871).
22. Winfield v. Henning, 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870).
23. Verplanck v. Wright, 23 Wend. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
24. Id.; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). Other covenants iecog-
nized by the end of the 19th century are listed in Northern Pac. Ry. v. McClure, 9 N.D. 73,
81 N.W. 52 (1899). See also 4 KENT, supra note 2, at 126 n.1 (note by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.).
25. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.9 at 364.
26. Id. at 365.
[Vol. 51
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the promise fall upon the promisor and his assigns as owners of a
servient estate. Strictly speaking, the servient estate was not the
land itself, but some present or a future interest in land. Neverthe-
less, the test applied for determining if the servient estate was duly
burdened was to ask whether or not the promise "touched and
concerned" the land. In other words, the promise had to affect the
use or enjoyment of the land in some way, not merely the liabilities
of the land owner. If it did not affect the use or enjoyment of the
land, the promise was deemed merely a "personal" cove-
nant-enforceable against the original promisor, but not against
his heirs or assigns.27
Moreover, for a covenant to run with the land, the covenant
had to benefit some dominant estate owned by the person seeking
enforcement. In other words, real covenants could not be held in
gross.2  The dominant and servient estates might be interests in
the same land (e.g., a leasehold and a reversion) or they might be
interests in different parcels.
Although the dominant estate, like the servient estate, was an
interest in land and not the land itself, the covenant had to im-
prove the desirability of the land in which the estate was held.
With the exception of promises to pay rent, covenants did not run
if the benefit merely served the unrelated business interests of the
dominant owner. 29 Thus, a lessee's engagement to maintain the im-
27. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583); Norman, 17 Wend.
136. What constitutes "touching and concerning" has been a matter upon which a great deal
of ink has been spread. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.4. The classic modern judicial treatment of
the topic is found in Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). I propose the following definition: A promise "touches and
concerns" both the burdened land and the benefited land if the burdened and benefited
parcels are so situated that breach of the promise would injure the possessor of the bene-
fited parcel in a way that could not normally be cured by substitutionary relief.
28. Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175 (1871). This remains true in most jurisdictions
today. See Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 2, §§ 542, 542 comment c, & 549. Professor Krasnowiecki of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania reports that in a national search involving many hundreds of cases,
he was able to find only two in which a covenant was enforced at the request of a plaintiff
who held no benefited land. Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New
Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 721 & 721 n.43 (1975). For a more recent analysis, see
Roberts, Promises Respecting Land Use-Can Benefits be Held in Gross? 51 Mo. L. REV.
933 (1986).
According to the Appellate Court of Illinois, that state may not enforce the requirement
that land be benefited quite as rigorously as most jurisdictions. Merrionette Manor Homes
Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. 2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956). See also VanSant v.
Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) (equitable relief).
29. The reversion (or remainder) is the dominant estate for a leasehold rent. At com-
mon law, fee simple rents, like easements, are incorporeal hereditaments, and do not require
a dominant estate. For cases relied upon by the drafters of the original Field Code, see Van
Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N.Y. 558 (1863); Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div.
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provements on leasehold property benefited the land and could
run with both the leasehold and the reversion,3" but a promise to
provide a property owner with free railroad tickets did not.31
Furthermore, a promise was not an enforceable real covenant
unless there was a property relationship between the original con-
tracting parties at the time of contracting. This prerequisite has
come to be known as the requirement of horizontal privity.32
At the beginning of the 19th century, the common law courts
required that the property relationship between the covenanting
parties be tenurial in nature. Thus, a landlord could enter into a
running covenant with his lessee, and a reversioner with his life
tenant;33 but the grantor and grantee of a fee simple absolute, who
were not parties to a tenurial relationship, were unable to benefit
or bind their respective assigns. In the ensuing years, however,
American judges broadened the scope of the relationships that
would fulfill the horizontal privity requirement. For example, in
the celebrated Massachusetts case of Morse v. Aldrich,s4 Cook had
conveyed to Hull a tract of land in fee, together with an easement
over Cook's retained land. This easement permitted Hull to dig out
and carry away soil from Cook's mill pond for fertilizer. Hull con-
veyed his dominant parcel to the plaintiff (Morse), who later cove-
nanted with Cook that Cook would "draw off his said pond when
thereto requested by said Morse, in the months of August and Sep-
tember ... for the purpose of giving said Morse an opportunity of
1866); Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Verplanck v. Wright, 23 Wend. 506
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
30. See supra note 8.
31. Lyford v. Northern Pac. Coast R.R., 92 Cal. 93, 28 P. 103 (1891).
32. The reporters of the Restatement of Property have taken the position that hori-
zontal privity is necessary only to the running of the burden. Under this theory, if A and B,
being neighboring landowners (i.e., not in privity of estate), covenant with each other that A
shall not operate a tavern on his property, both B and the assignees of B will be able to
enforce the promise against A, but neither B nor his assigns will be able to enforce A's
promise against A's successors. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.11 at 370. Precursors to the RE-
STATEMENT view date from the late 19th century. Id. at n.11.
33. This is the sort of privity required by Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep.
72 (K.B. 1583). See also the discussion in Bally v. Wells, Wilm. 341, 97 Eng. Rep. 130, 131-
32 (C.P. 1769). There is an abundance of landlord-tenant/running covenant cases from the
nineteenth century. Leading American decisions cited by the codifiers include Allen, 3
Denio 284; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Myers v. Burns, 33 Barb.
401 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); Demarest v. Willard, 8 Cow. 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); Davis v.
Morris, 35 Barb. 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 223, 5 P. 104
(1884); Bailey v. Richardson, 66 Cal. 416, 5 P. 910 (1885); Ellis v. Bradbury, 75 Cal. 234, 17
P. 3 (1888); and Hill v. McKay, 94 Cal. 5, 29 P. 406 (1892). For a case involving a life tenant
and reversioner, see Verplanck, 23 Wend. 506.
34. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837).
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digging and carrying out mud, &c .. .. Although the covenant
was not made between parties in a tenurial relationship, the court
held that Cook's successors were bound by it:
To create a covenant which will run with the land, it is neces-
sary that there should be a privity of estate between the covenan-
tor and covenantee. In these [cited] cases, and in most of the
cases on the same subject, the covenants were between lessors
and lessees; but the same privity exists between the grantor and
grantee, where a grant is made of any subordinate interest in
land; the reversion or residue of the estate being reserved by the
grantor, all covenants in support of the grant, or in relation to the
beneficial enjoyment of it, are real covenants and will bind the
assignee.36
In other words, a reversion is only one interest to which the benefit
of a covenant will attach; an easement or profit in the servient land
will suffice.
Another nineteenth century Massachusetts decision, Bronson
v. Coffin, 37 carried matters a good deal farther. It is of interest here
because its legal methodology foreshadows a 1980 Montana case. 8
In Bronson, the defendant's testator, a farmer, conveyed a tract of
land to a railway company. In the deed of conveyance the grantor
covenanted for himself and his assigns to "make and maintain a
sufficient fence through the whole length of that part of the rail-
road which runs through my farm." 9
After the farmer's death, his estate sold the farm by warranty
deed to the plaintiff who upon learning of the covenant in favor of
the railroad sued the estate on the covenant against incumbrances.
The estate's defense was that the covenant to maintain the fence
was not an incumbrance because it did not run with the land, and
therefore did not bind the plaintiff. The estate argued that in the
absence of a tenurial relationship or easement relationship between
the railroad and the defendants' testator at the time they entered
into the covenant, no privity of estate existed and the covenant
could not run.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the covenant bound the
plaintiffs:
Words sounding in covenant only may operate by way of
grant of an easement, wherever it is necessary to give them that
35. Id. at 450.
36. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted).
37. 108 Mass. 175 (1871).
38. Reichert v. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980); see infra Part V(D).
39. 108 Mass. at 176.
1990]
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effect in order to carry out the manifest intention of the parties.
In order to make a covenant run with the land of the cove-
nantor and bind his heirs and assigns, the covenantee must, ac-
cording to all the authorities, have such an interest in that land as
to amount to a privity of estate between the parties to the cove-
nant. In this Commonwealth, at least, it is not necessary that
their relation should be that of landlord and tenant; but an inter-
est in the nature of an easement in the land which the covenant
purports to bind, whether already existing, or created by the very
deed which contains the covenant, constitutes a sufficient privity
of estate to make the burden of a covenant to do certain acts
upon that land, for the support and protection of that interest
and the beneficial use and enjoyment of the land granted, run
with the land charged.40
The reasoning of the Bronson court is circular: (1) a valid cov-
enant creates an interest in the servient land in the nature of an
easement, (2) the mutual interests of the covenanting parties in
the servient land constitutes horizontal privity, and therefore, (3)
the covenant is valid. Whatever the shortcomings in the Bronson
analysis, however, the case expanded the notion of horizontal priv-
ity to include any successive grantor/grantee relationship, even if
the grantor retains no reversionary interest in, and no true ease-
ment over, the lands of the grantee.
The doctrine that a real covenant may be created in the grant
of a fee simple absolute is sometimes called the doctrine of "in-
stantaneous privity." By 1895, instantaneous privity had become
the prevailing rule in the United States for the running of both
benefits and burdens."' A few American judges, however, were of
the view that a tenurial relationship was necessary for the burden
to run when the original covenantor was a grantee. In other words,
these judges would not allow a covenant to run if it burdened
property simultaneously conveyed in fee simple absolute. This
view was particularly common in New York, "' and it became part
of the Field Code.' 3
Another prerequisite for the running of a real covenant was an
40. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
41. See, e.g., Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862). See also the state-
by-state review in SIMs, supra note 2, at 140-73.
42. There apparently was some thought that burdening a fee simple absolute was in
derogation of an otherwise unconditional grant. See Van Rensselaer v. Smith, 27 Barb. 104
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N.Y. 68 (1859); Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26
N.Y. 558 (1863); Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). For addi-
tional information on the law of privity in the late 19th century, see 2 KENT, supra note 2,
at 525-29 n.1 (note by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.).
43. See infra Part IV(E).
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adequate property relationship between the original covenantee
and the person seeking enforcement and between the original cove-
nantor and the person allegedly bound. This has come to be called
the doctrine of vertical privity.
Vertical privity existed on the benefit side if the present pos-
sessor of the dominant estate had derived his title from the cove-
nantee-as a purchaser, assignee, tenant, or subtenant.4 On the
burden side, the necessary connection between the covenantor and
the present possessor existed only if the- present possessor had
taken the entire estate of the covenantor. Thus, both the assignee
of a servient leasehold and the purchaser of a servient fee simple
could be liable for damages if they violated their original covenan-
tor's promise, but the tenant of a covenantor who owned the fee
simple was not so liable. Neither was the subtenant of a lessee-
covenantor. For in the latter two cases, the present possessor had
not taken the covenantor's entire estate.45
The nineteenth century courts divided on whether a purchaser
of a fee simple at a foreclosure sale was in vertical privity with a
covenanting party who had owned the property previous to the
sale. Arguably, the purchaser had taken a new title at the sale
rather than the estate of the former owner. In 1890, the New York
Court of Appeals accepted this position, ruling that such a pur-
chaser was not in vertical privity with the former owner, and that
"[c]ovenants running with the land do not bind him, nor do him
any good."''6 Two years later, the Supreme Court of Indiana held
to the contrary.'
A nineteenth century judge deciding whether or not to enforce
a promise as a real covenant looked at the instrument for some
indication that the contracting parties intended that the promise
run with the land. The parties did not need to set forth this intent
in express words unless the covenant was to construct some object
44. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.20 (relying mostly on 19th century cases).
45. In Davis v. Morris, 35 Barb. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861), for example, L leased to T-
1, who in turn conveyed his entire leasehold, except for the last day of the term, to T-2, who
took possession. T-2 promised to pay rent to T-1, but did not assume T-l's obligation to L.
T-1 became insolvent and failed to pay rent to L. L evicted T-2 and sued him for arrearages
of rent. Held: no privity of estate existed between L and T-2, therefore T-2 could not be
personally bound to remit unpaid rent.
Similarly, in Post v. Kearney, 2 N.Y. 394 (1849), L leased to E who assigned to J. W
took J's leasehold in foreclosure and assigned it to P who subleased to S. L's assignee sued
P. Held: P was in privity of estate with L and personally liable on the lease covenants. S was
not.
See also COKE ON LITTLETON 385a; 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.14.
46. O'Donnell v. McIntyre, 118 N.Y. 156, 162, 23 N.E. 455, 456 (1890) (tax sale).
47. Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Priest, 131 Ind. 413, 31 N.E. 77 (1892).
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not in existence at the time of contracting. In the latter event the
courts required that the promisor covenant explicitly for himself
and his assigns.' 8
Finally, when more than one person had purchased parts of
the benefited or burdened estate, there was no requirement that
they sue or be sued jointly, "[flor if lessee assigns twenty parts to
twenty persons, [the reversioner] may follow the assignee of every
part. If a reversion is broken into parts, the assignee of each part
may sue."' 9
C. Equitable Servitudes
In the nineteenth century, as today, an equitable servitude
was a contract running with the land in equity. Most real cove-
nants qualified as equitable servitudes. When a defendant had
breached a real covenant but the legal remedy was inadequate, the
chancery courts provided relief, usually in the form of an
injunction. 0
The more important equitable servitude cases involved
promises that, for one reason or another did not qualify as real
covenants. If the possessor of the servient estate had taken his in-
terest with notice of the promise, a court might still enforce the
promise in equity despite its deficiencies at law."
Equitable servitude doctrine seems to have developed in re-
sponse to inflexibilities in real covenant and negative easement
law. The English courts borrowed negative easement doctrine from
Roman legal sources.5 ' Negative easements had entered the com-
48. On this topic, see 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.3, a section based largely on 19th
century and early 20th century cases.
Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583), serves as an illustration of
how technical the judges could be on this point. Spencer and his wife, the fee owners, had
conveyed a term of years to a lessee. The lessee "covenanted for him, his executors, and
administrators" that "he, his executors, administrators, or assigns, would build a brick
wall." The lessee subsequently conveyed his leasehold to J., who in turn assigned it to the
defendant. When the wall was not built, Mr. and Mrs. Spencer sued the defendant on the
covenant. The plaintiffs lost because (1) the wall was not in existence at the time of con-
tracting and (2) the original lessee had "covenanted for him, his executors, and administra-
tors" that he or his assigns would build the wall but did not covenant for "him, his execu-
tors, administrators, and assigns." We can only speculate why the court read the covenant
so strictly. Perhaps it sought to ensure that, in an era without a recording system, assignees
of leases would be on notice of the scope of their obligations to the landlord.
49. Bally v. Wells, Wilm. 341, 346, 97 Eng. Rep. 130, 132 (C.P. 1769). See also Van
Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
50. See, e.g., Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim. 13, 58 Eng. Rep. 6 (Ch. 1830); St. Andrew's
Lutheran Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871).
51. See generally infra this Part II(C).
52. Four negative easements were thus imported: (1) the easement of view or prospect
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mon law by the sixteenth century; they are prominent in reported
cases dating from the Elizabethan and Stuart periods. 3 The value
of negative easements lay in the fact that, because they were inter-
ests in property (incorporeal hereditaments), they could be con-
veyed from one landowner to another without the need for a priv-
ity relationship. Like other easements, negative easements could
arise by prescription. Courts employed prescriptive negative ease-
ments as they employed the doctrine of nuisance: to protect a
plaintiff's expectancy interest in a situation in which the plaintiff
could rely upon no express contract or conveyance.
In the rapidly developing cities of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, negative easement doctrine was helpful, but it
was not sufficient. The courts did not recognize new kinds of nega-
tive easements readily enough to suit the needs of the time. More-
over, land developers (and land preservers) needed a contractual
device that would enable them to impose complex restrictions
upon property without the strictures of common law privity. Equi-
(q.v., infra this note), by which a dominant owner (or tenant) may prevent a servient owner
(or tenant) from blocking the view from the dominant estate, (2) the easement of light, by
which the servient owner can be prevented from blocking the passage of light into windows
on the dominant property, (3) the easement of support, whereby the servient owner cannot
change the contours of the property in such a way as to undermine land or buildings on the
dominant estate, and (4) the easement of water or water-drawing, whereby the servient
owner cannot interfere with the flow of water to the dominant estate through artificial chan-
nels laid over the servient land. According to some commentators, the easement of prospect
was only a covenant or equitable servitude in English law, not a negative easement. GOD-
DARD, supra note 2, at 112-13. However, GALE, supra note 2, at 304-06, states that restric-
tions on obstructing view may be created by grant as well as by covenant. Some of the
confusion may have arisen because easements of prospect could not be created by prescrip-
tion. Id.
Some modern writers claim the nineteenth century English courts limited negative
easements to four because of the lack of a comprehensive deed recording system. But that
statement may be misleading for two reasons. First, the total of four is accurate only if
prospect is disqualified as an easement, which is not altogether certain. [The total of four
may be based on a misreading of GALE, supra note 2, at 29 (the leading nineteenth century
commentator), which contains a list of the four principal negative easements.] Second, the
English courts could not have taken the deficiencies of the recording system too seriously,
for they created the negative easement of air and developed the equitable servitude
doctrine.
For the Roman prototypes of the English negative easements, see DIG. 8.1.5pr; 8.1.14.4;
8.3.1 (aquae ductus-water drawing); 8.2.4 (ne officiendi luminibus vicini-light); 8.2.12;
8.2.15 & 16 (prospectus-view); 8.2.1 (onera vicini-support).
53. See, e.g., Sury v. Pigot, Popham 166, 79 Eng. Rep. 1263 (1625) (water drawing).
Nuisance theory was another prominent device of the era, especially among urban landown-
ers. Cox v. Matthews, 3 Keble 133, 84 Eng. Rep. 636, 1 Ventris 237, 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (1673).
Nuisance and negative easement theory were often conjoined. See, e.g., Bowry and Pope's
Case, 1 Leon. 168, 74 Eng. Rep. 155 (Q.B. 1589) (dictum). For a case involving both nui-
sance and easement theory and some humorous Latin pleadings involving a pig sty, see
Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
30 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
table servitude law suited their needs almost perfectly.
Modern legal literature often repeats the inaccurate assertion
that equitable servitudes originated in the 1848 case of Tulk v.
Moxhay.5 4 In fact the idea that equity would enforce land restric-
tions founded in simple contract can be traced at least as far back
as the middle of the eighteenth century-and even earlier if, as has
been suggested, the idea grew out of the marriage settlement
cases. 55 Moreover, at least four other cases prior to Tulk, both
from English and American courts, contain either holdings or dicta
to the effect that covenants that do not run at law nevertheless
may run in equity."6
Many commentators unfamiliar with the prior history of equi-
table servitudes have cited a dictum from Keppell v. Bailey,57 to
the effect that Chancellors would not enforce promises not qualify-
ing as real covenants. That the dictum was not typical of the pe-
riod has already been shown, but it caught the fancy of David
Dudley Field. When he drafted his Code, he included the doctrine
of Keppell and eliminated most of the law of equitable
servitudes.58
Despite Mr. Field's hostility, equitable servitude doctrine
54. 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). That this was not so can be discov-
ered by reading the precedents cited in Tulk itself. Nevertheless, the myth of the initial
position of Tulk is widespread. See, e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2 at 485-86 (1984); 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & A. SMITH,
BASIC PROPERTY LAW 626-33 (especially note 2 at 632).
55. The first explicit statement I have found is Morris v. Lessees of Lord Berkeley, 2
Ves. Sen. 453, 28 Eng. Rep. 289 (Ch. 1752), in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to
prevent his neighbor from constructing a building which, the plaintiff alleged, would block
his light. In denying the injunction, the chancellor stated, "Whoever comes into this court
on such a right, must found it either on defendant's building so as to stop ancient lights, for
which [the plaintiff] has prescription . . . or else on some agreement, either proved, or rea-
sonable presumption thereof." Id. (emphasis supplied).
In the marriage settlement cases, a person (usually the father of the groom) had cove-
nanted to give an espoused couple certain lands as a wedding gift, but had not honored the
covenant. The courts charged the heirs with doing so as part of the price for entering into
their inheritance. See, e.g., Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243, 24 Eng. Rep. 715 (Ch. 1724);
Chilliner v. Chilliner, 2 Ves. Sen. 528, 28 Eng. Rep. 337 (Ch. 1754). These cases and Morris
all were cited by plaintiff's counsel in Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum, 2
My. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Ch. 1822).
56. Duke of Bedford, 2 My. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Lord Eldon states that
whether covenant can run at law is irrelevant to whether it can run in equity); Whatman v.
Gibson, 9 Sim. 196, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838) (Vice-Chancellor enforced covenants in
absence of horizontal privity); Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (New
York Chancellor enforced covenants that would not run at law); Mann v. Stephens, 15 Sim.
377, 60 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ch. 1846) (Vice-Chancellor enforced covenant despite lack of hori-
zontal privity; Lord Chancellor affirmed).
57. 2 My. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).
58. See infra Part III(A).
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thrived in the American courts of the nineteenth century. The
analogy to real covenants encouraged the chancellors to impose
some prerequisites similar or identical to those required for real
covenants. Specifically, chancellors, as well as the common law
judges, looked for a contract that "touched and concerned" both
dominant and servient estates. They examined the terms of the
contract to ensure that the parties had intended to bind and bene-
fit their respective successors. 9 But the contract that served as the
basis for the servitude could be quite informal; 0 if the intention of
the covenantee so indicated, the benefit of the servitude could be
"reserved in a stranger;""' and there was no horizontal privity
requirement.6 2
On both the benefit and the burden side, the equity courts
reduced the vertical privity rule to a requirement merely that the
person bound be in possession of the same land as that formerly
occupied by the initial promisor. The courts symbolized this devel-
opment by saying that equitable servitudes adhered to the land,
not to the promisor's estate in land. Contracts running in equity
were enforceable, not just against assignees, but against subten-
ants, licensees, and others who did not succeed to the entire estate
of the promisor."e
The statement that equitable servitudes adhered to land and
not to estates or to persons could be misleading. Equitable servi-
tudes did not invariably adhere to land, irrespective of persons. A
bona fide purchaser of legal title took free of equitable servitudes.
The obverse of this proposition is that equitable servitudes bound
only purchasers with notice of them. In this respect, real covenants
"adhered" to land to a greater extent than did equitable servi-
tudes, for there was no notice prerequisite for a real covenant to
59. On "touch and concern" in equity, see Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, 10 East
130, 103 Eng. Rep. 725 (Ch. 1808) and Winfield v. Henning, 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870). On
intent that the agreement run, see Barrow, 8 Paige Ch. 351 (Vice-Chancellor's opinion) and
BEHAN, supra note 2, at 115. On the need for a benefited estate, see 2 ALP, supra note 2, §
9.29 (relying largely on 19th century cases).
60. Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862); but see Heriot's Hosp. v. Gib-
son, 2 Dow. 301, 3 Eng. Rep. 873, 875 (H.L. 1814). Lord Eldon, who was subsequently af-
firmed, wrote, "[I]t was perfectly wild to say that the mere exhibition of a plan was suffi-
cient to form a binding contract." 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.25.
61. E.g., Barrow, 8 Paige Ch. 351.
62. Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sim. 196, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838); Mann v. Stephens,
15 Sim. 377, 60 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ch. 1846); and Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143 (Ch. 1848); Winfield, 21 N.J. Eq. 188; Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal.
114, 22 P. 53 (1889); Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 P. 275 (1889);
2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.26.
63. 2 ALP, supra note 2, §§ 9.27 & 9.31 (relying largely on 19th century cases).
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run.
64
During the nineteenth century, most of the equitable servitude
cases involved promises that were restrictive rather than affirma-
tive in nature; litigation over building limitations was particularly
common.6 5 Equity chancellors enforced restrictive agreements by
prohibitory injunction.
Chancellors also employed injunctions to enforce affirmative
duties. Such injunctions were prohibitory in form but mandatory
in fact.16 Although English courts eventually adopted the rule that
affirmative obligations were not enforceable in equity, 7 American
courts at the time of codification recognized no such limitation. 8
The chancellors enforced affirmative obligations to pay money
by employing the equitable lien. An illustrative case is Fresno Ca-
nal & Irrigation Co. v. Dunbar,69 a decision cited by the Montana
codifiers in their annotation to section 1983 of the 1895 code. In
Dunbar, the plaintiff company entered into an agreement with
Roeding wherein the plaintiff agreed to furnish Roeding with a cer-
tain amount of water for irrigating his land. Roeding, in turn,
agreed to accept the water over an extended period and to pay a
specified price for it. The contract further provided that "the
water. .. is intended to form a part of the appurtenances to said..
. land, and the right thereto shall be transferable only with and run
with said land, and [the company] is bound by this instrument to
all subsequent owners of said land, but to no other person." 70 To
the foregoing the provision was subjoined, "It is covenanted that
this agreement and the covenants therein contained, on the part of
64. For examples of the notice requirement for equitable servitudes, see Tulk, 2 Phil-
lips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 and Winfield, 21 N.J. Eq. 188. See also 2 POMEROY, supra note
2, at 959.
65. E.g., Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim. 13, 58 Eng. Rep. 6; Whatman, 9 Sim. 196, 59
Eng. Rep. 333; Mann, 15 Sim. 377, 60 Eng. Rep. 665; Tulk, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143; Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862); St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871); Barrow, 8 Paige Ch. 351; Winfield, 21 N.J. Eq. 188.
66. Cooke v. Chillcott, 3 Ch. D. 694 (1876) (injunction issued restraining the defendant
from keeping or leaving the plaintiff's house without a proper supply of water).
67. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.36.
68. 3 POMEROY, supra note 2, at 1996-97. It is difficult, however, to find 19th century
mandatory injunction cases. Id. at 2069. But see 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.36, at 438-39. In
the 20th century the English view influenced the law in a few U.S. jurisdictions, notably
New York and New Jersey. Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913); Furness v.
Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (Ch. Div. 1960).
69. 80 Cal. 530, 22 P. 275 (1889). Cases involving the same company and similar agree-
ments include Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53 (1889); Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Park, 129 Cal. 437, 62 P. 87 (1900). For another equitable lien case
of the era, see Rohn v. Odenwelder, 162 Pa. 364, 29 A. 899 (1894) (annual charge of $250
placed in a deed).
70. Dunbar, 80 Cal. at 533; 22 P. at 276.
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[Roeding], run with and bind the land."7
Roeding subsequently conveyed his land to the defendant,
who refused to pay for water furnished to him. The company sued
both for a personal judgment against the defendant and for fore-
closure of a lien against the property. The trial court granted both
remedies.
The California Supreme Court reversed the personal judg-
ment. The court observed that the agreement in question did not
qualify as a covenant running with the land because the require-
ment of horizontal privity had not been met. Specifically, the cove-
nant had not been contained in a grant of the burdened land. But
the court afforded relief in equity:
There is an express agreement that it shall bind the land it-
self; therefore, it does not depend upon the question whether a
covenant on the part of the then owner of the property would run
with the land or not. The question is, whether the provision in
the contract was such as to create a lien upon the land. We think
it perfectly clear from the language used that this was the inten-
tion of the parties .... This, we think, created a lien upon the
land, and as the complaint alleges that the contract was acknowl-
edged and recorded, it was notice to the appellant of the exis-
tence of such lien. Under such a covenant the land is liable in the
hands of a subsequent purchaser."
In sum, when a court imposed a lien to enforce an affirmative equi-
table servitude, the land became subject to the charge imposed.
But the owner of the burdened land was personally liable on an
agreement only if he was one of the original parties thereto, or if
the agreement qualified as a real covenant."
Both equitable servitudes and real covenants were hybrid enti-
ties; they enlisted both contract principles and property principles.
The courts, however, tended to grant property status more liber-
ally to equitable servitudes than to real covenants. Equitable servi-
tudes continued to bind the land even when the estate of the origi-
nal promisor had been destroyed; they bound subtenants as well as
assignees; and they persisted even when the possessor of the servi-
ent estate had no personal liability on the original promise. By the
late nineteenth century, lawyers compared equitable servitudes to
71. Id.
72. Id. at 535, 22 P. at 277.
73. 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.17 at 387 (relying largely on 19th century cases). For a
20th century example of an equitable lien being imposed where the supporting covenant did
not run with the land, see Everett Factories & Terminal Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers Corp.,
300 Mass. 499, 15 N.E.2d 829 (1938).
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easements as often as to covenants, often labelling them "equitable
easements" or, incorrectly, as "negative easements." The affinity
between equitable servitudes and easements was to have signifi-
cant impact in the 20th century.7 '
D. The Purely Restitutionary Equitable Lien
During the 20th century, the courts often have remedied de-
fective, incomplete, or expired land restrictions by imposition of
the purely restitutionary equitable lien.75 Such a lien has no basis
in contract; it is a device to prevent unjust enrichment of a prop-
erty owner who, willingly (or under some circumstances unwill-
ingly) accepts benefits but refuses to pay for them.
I have not been able to find any late nineteenth century cases
in which the courts imposed purely restitutionary liens as servi-
tudes upon land. Nevertheless, the judiciary of the time had al-
ready forged all of the legal tools necessary for the job. The era's
leading commentator on equity, Dean Pomeroy, had the following
to say on the subject:
In addition to the general doctrine that equitable liens are cre-
ated by executory contracts which, in express terms, stipulate
that property shall be held, assigned, or transferred as security
for the promisor's debt or other obligation, there are some further
instances where equity raises similar liens, without agreement
therefor between the parties, based either upon general consider-
ations of justice (ex aequo et bono), or upon the particular equita-
ble principle that he who seeks the aid of equity in enforcing
some claim must himself do equity . ... 76
Pomeroy then proceeds to list a number of instances in which
purely restitutionary liens have been imposed. One of these-the
lien in favor of a joint owner who has made repairs upon the share
of another joint owner-is particularly susceptible to extension to
the case of defective or expired servitudes.
7
74. For a case cited by the Montana codifiers equating equitable servitudes with ease-
ments, see Winfield v. Henning, 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870). For the impact of the negative
easement doctrine in Montana, see infra Part V(C), (D) & (E).
75. See infra note 77 and text accompanying notes 198-200.
76. 3 POMEROY, supra note 2, § 1239 at 1902.
77. E.g., Bina v. Bina, 213 Iowa 432, 239 N.W. 68 (1931) (co-owner of easement enti-
tled to contribution when no maintenance agreement existed); Island Improvement Ass'n v.
Ford, 155 N.J. Super. 571, 383 A.2d 133 (1978) (property owners association owning roads
entitled to contribution from users).
[Vol. 51
RUNNING WITH THE LAND
III. THE CIVIL CODE: ORIGIN AND THEORY
A. Introduction
The original New York Civil Code ("Field Code") was pub-
lished in 1865. Its principal draftsman was the noted New York
City practitioner and reformer, David Dudley Field (1805-1894).
Although never adopted in New York, the Field Code subse-
quently became the law of the Dakota Territory (1866), of Califor-
nia (1872), of the states of North and South Dakota (1890), and of
Montana (1895). The language of the Field Code provisions on cov-
enants running with the land was adopted almost verbatim into
the California, Dakota, and Montana compilations. There have
since been major amendments to these provisions in California and
minor amendments in South Dakota. In North Dakota and Mon-
tana, those provisions remain unaltered to this day.78
We are able to reconstruct fairly accurately the meaning and
intent of the New York Civil Code provisions as Field drafted
them. We can do so by taking into account what we know of the
nineteenth century common law, the structure of the Code in gen-
eral, the content of each section, Field's annotations to each sec-
tion, and the Code Commissioners' statements on how their statute
ought to be used.
We can also reconstruct, with a few unanswered questions, the
meaning that the Montana codifiers placed upon the identical pro-
visions. In most cases, that meaning is the same as Field's. When
divergences between Field and the Montana drafters arise, they
are traceable to two factors. First, the Montana drafters antici-
pated a different relationship bkween the Code and the common
law than the relationship which Field anticipated. Second, the
Montana drafters did not annotate their Code with all of Field's
cases. They selected some he had omitted, and they adopted many
California decisions construing the Code after its enactment in
that state in 1872.
B. Background and Construction of the Original Field Code
In order to understand how the provisions of the original Field
Code were to be interpreted, it is necessary to understand the
background of its principal draftsman, David Dudley Field. Field
78. These statutes are currently found at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-201 to -206
(1989); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1460 to -1467 (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODEt §§ 47-04-24 to -30
(Allen Smith 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-12-1 to -6 (Allen Smith 1983). They
were originally §§ 691 to -698 of the Field Code and §§ 1983 to -1990 of the MONT. CIV. CODE
(1895).
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was a disciple, although not an uncritical one, of Jeremy Bentham,
the eccentric utilitarian who coined the word "codify. '79 Like Ben-
tham, Field employed much of his long life tirelessly promoting the
cause of codification. Arguably, Field's greatest achievement was
his leadership of New York's Commission on Practice. This was
the commission that issued the first modern rules of civil proce-
dure under a merged system of law and equity. The New York leg-
islature enacted Field's Code of Civil Procedure in 1848, and most
American jurisdictions, including Montana, ultimately modeled
their procedural rules on it.
Field, like Bentham before him, saw codification as the cure
for many of the limitations in the common law: the post hoc impo-
sition of rules upon parties who had already acted;80 the extensive
research necessary to squeeze a rule or principle out of voluminous
case reports and the frequent uncertainty of the answer;8" the inac-
cessibility of law to the layman;82 the adherence of the courts to
archaic and unjust determinations; 83 and the continuation, over
years or even centuries, of certain disputed questions. " Moreover,
as a positivist in the vein of John Austin, Field conceived of law as
nothing more than the command of the sovereign. 6 Thus, when
judges ventured beyond precedent, they made law, they did not
discover or extrapolate it. A judge in that circumstance, Field ar-
gued, was a legislator-a role inconsistent with the American polit-
ical theory of separation of powers. Field maintained that the
79. For Bentham's ideas and his influence in and contact with America, see COOK,
supra note 2, at 74-78 & 97-103.
80. DDF, Works supra note 2, at 420.
81. Id. at 240, 255-56.
82. Id. at 233, 239, 253.
83. N.Y. CIv. CODE xxvi-xxvii (1865) (introduction):
In almost every instance where an improvement has been made in the laws, it has
come from the Legislature. Had society been left to the discipline of the common
law . . . , the most cruel and bloody of criminal systems would still have shamed
us; feudal tenures with all their burdensome incidents would have remained; land
would have been inalienable without livery of seizin, and wives would have had
only the rights which a barbarous age conceded them.
Id.
84. Id. at xxix.
85. DDF, Works, supra note 2, at 250, 254. Section 2 of the Field Civil Code reads as
follows: "Law is a rule of property and of conduct, prescribed by the sovereign power of the
State." Field's chief antagonist, James Coolidge Carter, had been taught by a student of
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the most important figure in the German historical school of
jurisprudence, and his view of the nature of law was accordingly different. Carter argued
that private law was custom, and the function of judges was to discover the appropriate
legal rules from custom and apply them to the facts of each case. The most complete, and
today the most accessible, statement of Carter's views is to be found in CARTER, supra note
2, a series of lectures planned for delivery at the Harvard Law School, but never presented,
due to their author's intervening death.
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proper task of a judge was to apply the law to the facts, not to
make law. Codification would serve as the method by which the
legislature would dictate the rules to the judges, who would then
submissively apply them. 6
In 1857, the New York legislature appointed Field and two
other outstanding lawyers to codify the substantive law of the
state. Over the next eight years, Field and his associates drafted a
Political Code, a Penal Code, and a Civil Code. Field himself had
primary responsibility for most of the Civil Code, including all of
its sections on real property.
The Civil Code included among its provisions certain statutes
then in force in New York. Most of its sections, however, summa-
rized the existing common law of New York. Where there was no
authority in that state, Field borrowed rules from other jurisdic-
tions, notably England. Pursuant to legislative authorization, the
Code also contained suggested alterations in existing rules and res-
olutions of conflicting precedents. The Code Commissioners listed
some, but not all, of these suggested alterations in the Introduction
to the Civil Code. 8
As set forth in the Civil Code, the sections on running cove-
nants embodied no existing statutes. Thus, the Field Code law of
running covenants is mostly a summary of nineteenth century New
York common law. In a few instances, Field proposed alterations in
the existing rules.89
The Field Civil Code was unlike modern American codification
projects in that it was not designed merely to clarify pre-existing
law or to operate in the context of pre-existing law. The Field Code
was designed to wholly displace pre-existing law, and it was
drafted with that purpose in mind. Upon its enactment, nearly all
decided cases-the entire body of common law and equity-would
be deported to the realm of history. Only when the codifiers had
inadvertently overlooked a substantive area would prior cases sur-
vive. One goal of the codifiers was to enable New York lawyers to
clear their shelves of thousands of superseded volumes.9
86. DDF, Works, supra note 2, at 239. The need to restrain judicial legislation and
judicial discretion was a recurring motif in arguments for codification. See, e.g., COOK, supra
note 2, at 138, 174 & 179.
87. For example, the provisions governing estates in land (N.Y. CIv. CODE §§ 218 - 239)
(MONT. CIv. CODE §§ 1210-1230) relied heavily upon the NEW YORK REVISED STATUTES OF
1828, 1 N.Y. REV. STAT. 721-25, §§ 1-29. These provisions have long been repealed in New
York, but continue in force in Montana. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-15-201 to -216 (1989).
88. N.Y. CIV. CODE xxvi-xxvii (1865) (introduction).
89. See generally Part IV, infra. None of these changes is listed among the 120 set
forth in the Introduction to the Civil Code.
90. The purpose of the Code in displacing the common law is revealed in a few of its
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Traditionally, Anglo-American courts had interpreted statutes
strictly, when such statutes altered the common law. All doubts
concerning a statute's coverage were resolved against the statute.
The Code was not to be so construed. 1 Field envisioned a method
of judging analogous to the jurisprudence of the Code Napoleon.
As outlined in the Introduction to the New York Civil Code, this
method would be as follows:
First: One would turn to the Code to see if it controlled the
case. All provisions would be broadly construed; that is, ambigui-
ties would be resolved in favor of coverage.
Second: If the first step was not sufficient to solve the case,
one would determine if the codifiers had (inadvertently) over-
looked any applicable rules of common law. If so, those common
law rules would control. Field believed, however, that his Code was
substantially complete and that pre-existing common law would
seldom control.2
Third: If the answer was not found in the first or second steps,
one would try to solve the case through reasoning by analogy from
other parts of the Code.
Fourth: If an analogy could not be found, nor any rule that
had been overlooked and omitted, then the courts would either
have to leave the case undecided or resort to "the dictates of natu-
ral justice." There was no provision for returning to pre-existing
law.9 3
provisions. Section 3(3) of the Civil Code defined "common law" to include "the judgments
of the tribunals enforcing those rules which, though not enacted, form what is known as
customary or common law." This definition is broad enough to include equity. Section 6
stated, "In this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the
five Codes." See also the jurisprudential directions in the text immediately following this
note.
The "five codes" were the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (adopted in New York in 1848),
the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (adopted in 1881), the PENAL CODE (adopted in 1881), the
POLITICAL CODE (generally a restatement of public law statutes existing as of 1860, but never
adopted as a unity), and the CIVIL CODE (never adopted). Montana's four 1895 codes are
based upon the foregoing, except that it was not believed necessary to replace the Montana
criminal procedural statute, which was already based largely on Field concepts.
91. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 2032 (1865) ("The rule that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed has no application to this Code.").
92. I believe Field admitted this loophole for pre-existing law merely to reduce the
force of anticipated objections to adoption. In the introduction to the Civil Code, Field
pointed out that he had inserted a similar provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, but as
of 1865 it had never been used. N.Y. CIv. CODE xvii (1865) (introduction). See also N.Y. CIv.
CODE xviii (the second step is deleted entirely).
93. In his reliance upon natural justice rather than the principle of utility, Field de-
parted from Bentham. In his willingness to allow judges to move outside the Code, Field
departed from the Code Napoleon.
These four steps are outlined in the Introduction to the N.Y. CIv. CODE xviii-xix (1865).
This hierarchy may be compared to a different one proposed by Justice Story: (1) Code, (2)
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To be sure, the Code commissioners annotated their work with
citations to decided cases and published treatises as well as with
their own comments. Those cases and treatises were cited only to
illustrate the meaning of the Code, and were otherwise of no
authority.
Because the Civil Code was to be an almost wholly self-con-
tained system, the drafters composed its provisions differently
than they would have if they had intended that common law sur-
vive. For example, sections 245 and 246 set forth the "servitudes"
(burdens attached to land) that could be created under the statute.
Section 245 stated, "The following land burdens, or servitudes
upon land may be attached to other land as incidents or appurte-
nances and are then called easements." '94 That wording was fol-
lowed by a list of seventeen such easements. On the list were im-
portant, well-recognized easements such as the right of way as well
as such minutiae as "the right of having public conveyances
stopped or of stopping the same on land."95 Similarly, the intro-
reasoning by analogy from the Code, and (3) pre-existing common law. CooK, supra note 2,
at 177.
94. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 245 (1865).
95. N.Y. Civ. CODE § 245 is now MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101 (1989). Subsections (18)
and (19) were added subsequently. The section as it exists today reads in its entirety as
follows:
The following land burdens or servitudes upon land may be attached to other land
as incidents or appurtenances and are then called easements:
(1) the right of pasture;
(2) the right of fishing;
(3) the right of taking game;
(4) the right-of-way;
(5) the right of taking water, wood, minerals, and other things;
(6) the right of transacting business upon land;
(7) the right of conducting lawful sports upon land;
(8) the right of receiving air, light, or heat from or over or discharging the
same upon or over land;
(9) the right of receiving water from or discharging the same upon land;
(10) the right of flooding land;
(11) the right of having water flow without diminution or disturbance of any
kind;
(12) the right of using a wall as a party wall;
(13) the right of receiving more than natural support from adjacent land or
things affixed thereto;
(14) the right of having the whole of a division fence maintained by a cotermi-
nous owner;
(15) the right of having public conveyances stopped or of stopping the same
on land;
(16) the right of a seat in church;
(17) the right of burial;
(18) the right of conserving open space to preserve park, recreational, historic,
aesthetic, cultural, and natural values on or related to land;
(19) the right of receiving sunlight or wind for recognized nonfossil forms of
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ductory wording of section 246 stated, "The following land burdens
or servitudes upon land, may be granted and held though not at-
tached to land," and a list of five servitudes followed.96 In a com-
mon law system, one might well read the phrases "may be at-
tached" or "may be granted" as non-exclusive, i.e., other
easements or servitudes in gross could be created by judicial deci-
sion. But this clearly is not what Field intended. Indeed, in his day
the dominant view was that the number of permissible easements
was limited, even at common law. 7 Field did not state that "these
servitudes may be created and no others" because in an all-inclu-
sive code such language was not necessary; he could create an ex-
clusive list by employing the word "may" without further restric-
tion. A great deal of judicial misunderstanding about the meaning
of the Code has since arisen because judges and lawyers have for-
gotten the displacement premise of the drafters. 8
C. Dakota Territory and the California Experiment
The first adoption of the Field Civil Code was by the legisla-
ture of the Dakota territory in 1866. Although Dakota retained the
Code's common law-displacement provisions, they do not seem to
have had much effect. 9
California enacted the Code in 1872 at the urging of David
energy generation.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101 (1989).
96. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 246 became MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102 (1989), which is set
forth below. Subsection (6) was added by the Montana codifiers in 1895, and subsection (7)
was added subsequently.
The following land burdens or servitudes upon land may be granted and held
though not attached to land:
(1) the right of pasture and of fishing and taking game;
(2) the right of a seat in church;
(3) the right of burial;
(4) the right of taking rents and tolls;
(5) the right-of-way;
(6) the right of taking water, wood, minerals, or other things;
(7) the right of conserving open space to preserve park, recreational, historic,
aesthetic, cultural, and natural values on or related to land.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102 (1989).
97. BEHAN, supra note 2, at 45; GODDARD, supra note 2, at 29-30. See also Norcross v.
James, 140 Mass. 188, 192, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (1885) (Holmes, J.). GALE, supra note 2, was
more ambivalent. Cf. id. at 20 & 26. Actually, given the structure of these particular sec-
tions, the better reading, even when treated as a statute resting in the common law, is that
the list is exclusive. See infra Part IV(A).
98. See infra Part V(C)-(E).
99. The history of the Code in the Dakotas and a short sketch of its history in Califor-
nia is contained in Fisch, supra note 2. I have been unable to find any comparable work for
Montana.
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Dudley Field's brother, Stephen Field.100 Unlike the Dakotas, Cali-
fornia rejected the original "displacement" approach. Instead, the
California drafters specified that the Code should be "liberally
construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote jus-
tice,"101 and that the common law, where not inconsistent with the
Code, remained the rule of decision in all the courts of the state. In
addition, Code provisions would be construed as continuations of
any statutes or common law rules to which the Code provisions
were substantially similar.102
The California approach proved largely unworkable in prac-
tice. Field had designed his Code to be comprehensive, internally
consistent, and self-contained-not to lie in a bed of common law.
We have already seen, for example, how the language employed in
the Code sections on servitudes made sense only on the supposi-
tion that the common law was being wholly superseded. 3
The difficulties inherent in forcing the Code and common law
to co-exist were aggravated by the failure of the California courts
to adopt a consistent code/common law methodology. California
judges wandered between expansive construction and traditional
strict construction, lingering at every point in between-sometimes
all in the course of the same opinion.0 4
100. This was the same Stephen Field who was later associate justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
101. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4 (1872).
102. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5 (1872).
103. See supra Part III(B). Another illustration of the poor fit between the Code and
the common law is the following: In constructing his code, Field borrowed many civil law
terms and concepts - terms and concepts unknown in Anglo-American law and bound to
create problems when employed in conjunction with the common law. See, e.g., § 162, pro-
viding an alternate definition of real property as "immovable" property. Field probably
never should have borrowed from civilian jurisprudence at all, even given his displacement
assumption. Moreover, his use of civilian terms was vague and imprecise. See AMos, supra
note 2, at 94-108, one of the more penetrating and lasting critiques of Field's work.
104. Fisch, supra note 2, at 25-37. If anything, I think the variation even is wider than
conceded by Professor Fisch. Part of the problem may have been that Stephen Field did not
understand his brother's common law displacement approach. See id. at 42 (citing Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886)(Field, J., construing the DAKOTA CIVIL CODE)).
Although Dakota had retained the displacement approach, Justice Field began his analysis
with a review of the common law.
In 1883, the dean of the law school at Hastings College, John Norton Pomeroy (whose
treatise on equity is cited several times in this paper), contended in an influential series of
articles that the California courts ought to, in effect, cashier the liberal construction rule
and return to the rule of strict construction. This would enable the common law to govern in
all cases of doubt. Dean Pomeroy offered his suggestion in the hope that it might encourage
a consistent course of Code interpretation. The effect, however, was to agitate further the
jurisprudential soup. Fisch at 32-37.
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D. Adoption in Montana
In 1889, the Montana Bar Association petitioned for codifica-
tion of state law, and in March of that year the territorial legisla-
ture, anticipating imminent statehood, established a three-man
code commission. The chairman was former territorial Chief Jus-
tice Decius S. Wade. Its other two members were former territorial
Governor B. Platt Carpenter and Frederick W. Cole, a Butte attor-
ney who had served as a judge in Nevada.10 5
The Montana codifiers had many of the same purposes that
Field had adopted, and they borrowed many of his arguments: cod-
ification was possible and historically justified; the common law
was unresponsive and cruel; codification would render the law
more rational, more certain, more accessible, and more harmoni-
ous; and codification would place the people's elected representa-
tives, rather than the judges, in control of legislation.0 6
Because California was a source of recent cases decided under
the Code, the Montana drafters relied heavily upon California
cases in their annotations. They also included cases from other ju-
risdictions and selections from Mr. Field's original notes. These
blended annotations are useful in elucidating the Code as the
Montana drafters understood it. When the Montana annotations
follow those of the original Field Code, they suggest that the un-
derstanding of the Montana and New York drafters was the same.
When those annotations include authorities at variance with Field,
they suggest a different intent. Sometimes this is an intent to fol-
low California precedent, but that is not always so.
More ominous than the inclusion of California cases in the
Code annotations was the decision to adopt the California methods
of construction.10 7 In view of the ideals and goals of the Montana
105. Root, supra note 2, at 592. Wade was a judge on the territorial supreme court
from 1871 to 1887. Id. On Cole, see infra note 108.
106. See generally the speeches by William E. Cullen, Wilbur F. Sanders, and Decius
S. Wade to the Montana Bar Association, in Proceedings of the Montana Bar Association
271-97 & 318-37 (1885-1902). See also Report of the Code Committee 1-2 (1895) (pamphlet).
107. Of course, sometimes following a California case requires adopting California
Code construction methods, but this is not always true.
The California construction rules appear in the following section of the MONTANA CIVIL
CODE:
The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed, has no application to this code. The code establishes the law of this
state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are to be liber-
ally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
MONT. CIv. CODE § 4652 (1895).
The provisions of this code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing
statutes, or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not
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codifiers, they could not have done worse than to adopt the ill-
fitting California approach.""8 In Montana, as in California, the un-
as new enactments.
MONT. CIV. CODE § 4653 (1895).
The MONTANA POLITICAL CODE provided as follows:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with
the constitution of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this state, or
of the codes, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.
MONT. POL. CODE § 5152 (1895).
108. Governor Preston H. Leslie, who proposed codification to the legislature, seems to
have favored a plan closer to the displacement model than to the California co-existence
model. He suggested that a code should, "when authoritatively prescribed, be the law and
the only law of this commonwealth" except when inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution
and subsequent statutes. 1889 Mont. Ter. Leg., H.J. 6, 26 (message from Governor Preston
H. Leslie to 1889 Montana Territorial Legislature).
It is not clear why the Montana codifiers accepted the California approach. Perhaps it
was due to the Montana Territorial Supreme Court's long-standing practice of looking to
California precedent for assistance in interpreting the CIVIL PRACTICE ACT of 1864 and the
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE of 1877. See, e.g., Creighton v. Hershfield, 2 Mont. 386, 390
(1876); Hershfield v. Aiken, 3 Mont. 442, 449 (1880); Lindley v. Davis, 6 Mont. 453, 455, 13
P. 118, 120 (1887). It is inferable from the work of one scholar that the Montana codifiers
followed California jurisprudence because of the failure of earlier attempts at indigenous
codification. SPENCE, supra note 2, at 194.
Some Montanans have suggested to me that the influence of California in territorial
days may have induced the Montana codifiers to adopt California methods. In 1889, how-
ever, it already had been a quarter of a century since disappointed '49ers, among others, had
flooded the Montana gold fields. Perhaps there was an inertial influence. In any event, the
biographies of the leading Montana codification advocates reveal only tenuous connections
with California. Frederick W. Cole, a member of the commission, was a Virginian, who had
been a judge in Nevada and who had practiced briefly (two years) in San Francisco. The
Butte Miner, Dec. 21, 1895, at 5, col. 1. John E. Rickards, the governor who signed the
Codes into law (but not otherwise an important codification figure) had spent four years in
San Francisco-as a salesman. PROGRESSIVE MEN, supra note 2, at 385-86.
Most of the influential codifiers were from the East or Midwest, largely from New York
and Ohio. These figures included the following:
(1) Wilbur F. Sanders-first president of the Montana Bar Association, a native of New
York who had practiced law in Ohio. PROGRESSIVE MEN, supra note 2, at 33.
(2) William H. Hunt-primary sponsor of the code commission bill in the territorial
house of representatives, and chairman of the judiciary committee, born in Louisiana, at-
tended Yale (but did not graduate), territorial attorney general, 1885-87. RAYMER, supra
note 2, at 399;
(3) Code Commissioner Decius S. Wade-justice of the territorial supreme court (1871-
87), a native of Ohio, an Ohio practitioner (Root, supra note 2, at 592), and at the time of
codification a Helena lawyer and businessman. SPENCE, supra note 2, at 245.
(4) Code Commissioner B. Platt Carpenter-a former Montana territorial governor,
who was a native of New York, and who had practiced and held office there. RAYMER, supra
note 2, at 273; SPENCE, supra note 2, at 234 & 245.
(5) Gov. Preston H. Leslie-the territorial governor who proposed codification had
come from Kentucky, where he had also served as governor. RAYMER, supra note 2, at 275.
(6) William E. Cullen-Sanders' law partner in Helena, first treasurer of the Montana
Bar Association and later president, Governor Leslie's attorney general, a native of Ohio
who had practiced in Minnesota before coming to Montana. PROGRESSIVE MEN, supra note
2, at 118; Montana Territorial Council Journal 255 (1889); SPENCE, supra note 2, at 166.
(7) Rudolph Von Tobel-principal sponsor of the code bills in the state house of repre-
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easy coexistence of Code and common law had the effect of render-
ing both statutory and case law difficult to interpret and apply. In
contrast to the codifiers' aims of certainty, accessibility, harmony,
and legislative supremacy, the Montana law, at least in the area of
running covenants, has proved to be uncertain, inaccessible, and
disharmonious. Nor has the Code proved much of a barrier to judi-
cial legislation.109
IV. THE LAW OF THE CODE
A. The Exclusive Methods of Binding Land
The Montana Civil Code provided two methods by which the
interests of the possessor of one tract of land could be made sub-
servient to the interests of the possessor of another tract: (1) the
imposition of servitudes burdening land,10 and (2) the execution
of covenants appurtenant to estates in land."'
All servitudes burdened servient land, but some were appurte-
nant to dominant land and some were held in gross. Those appur-
tenant to dominant land were called easements and were listed by
subject matter in one section of the Code. Field had enumerated 17
permissible easements, and the Montana codifiers adopted this list
verbatim. Field provided that five of those 17 could be held in
gross. The Montana codifiers retained this list and added one of
the easements as a permissible servitude in gross: the right of tak-
ing water, wood, materials, or other things from the servient land.
These lists of permitted servitudes were detailed and specific.
All indications are that Field intended these enumerations to be
exclusive, i.e., no servitudes were permitted that were not on one of
the two lists." 2
Despite the Montana codifiers' adoption of the provisions of
the common law not inconsistent with the Code, their intent in
this respect was the same as Field's: the enumerated servitudes
were exclusive. We can reconstruct this intent from several frag-
ments of evidence. First, the Code was more of a restatement than
sentatives in 1895 and a native of New York who spent his young adulthood in Iowa. PRO-
GRESSIVE MEN, supra note 2, at 466-67.
109. See generally infra Part V.
110. MONT. Civ. CODE §§ 1250, 1251 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-101, -
102 (1989)). When reference is made to servitudes throughout this Part, these two sections
are the source, unless indicated to the contrary.
111. MONT. CIv. CODE §§ 1983 to -1990 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-
201 to -206 (1989)). The division between binding land and binding estates in land is essen-
tially a civil law/common law distinction.
112. See supra Part III(B).
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a revision of the common law, and the dominant view at the time
was that the common law severely limited the number of permissi-
ble easements. ' Second, the Montana annotations to the servi-
tude provisions made no reference to any servitudes outside the
enumerated categories. Third, the enumerated servitudes included
several so rare or of so little importance (such as the right of a seat
in church or of stopping public conveyances) that their inclusion
makes sense only if the lists were to be exclusive. Fourth, the fact
that the Montana codifiers felt it necessary to add to the enumer-
ated servitudes in gross suggests a belief that there would be no
servitudes in gross other than those enumerated. Fifth, Field had
integrated the common law of profits a prendre into the general
servitude law, and the Montana codifiers retained this arrange-
ment. Sixth, there would have been little point to having two sepa-
rate lists-one of easements, the other of servitudes in gross-with
one list shorter than the other, unless the drafters intended each
enumeration to be exclusive." 4 Seventh, the Montana codifiers re-
tained the Field plan of providing an alternative mechanism for
adopting land use regulations outside the scope of permissible
easements: the creation of covenants running with estates in land.
The provisions of the Code dealing with covenants running
with the land are contained in the Title "Transfer of Obligations."
The structure of the Title indicates that the codifiers conceived of
covenants running with the land as an exception to the usual rules
governing transfer of obligations." 5 Just as servitudes were appur-
tenant to land, so were covenants appurtenant to estates in land.
The fact that they were appurtenant to estates justified alteration
of the normal rules of obligation transfer.
The permissible subject matter of covenants was broader than
that of servitudes. However, the New York and Montana codifiers
imposed strictures on the creation and enforcement of cove-
nants-strictures that did not apply to servitudes,"' and they ex-
pressly prohibited the running of covenants that did not comply
113. See supra note 97.
114. The Montana Legislature has recognized the exclusive nature of the two lists on
several occasions by adding to the number of permissible servitudes. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 70-17-101(18)-(19) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102(7) (1989); and MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-17-301 (1989).
115. See, e.g., MONT. CIV. CODE § 1980 (1895) ("The burden of an obligation may be
transferred with the consent of the party entitled to its benefits, but not otherwise except as
provided by § 1989."). The latter section is part of the "covenants" scheme. It discharges
one selling his interest in burdened property and not remaining in privity of contract with
the obligee.
116. See infra Part IV(C)-(E) & (G).
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with these statutory limitations.' 17 The drafters in New York
clearly intended to abolish the equitable servitude as a separate
entity. Parties would have to comply with the same formalities and
would be subject to the same rules whether the relief sought for
breach was legal or equitable. " 8
Whether the Montana codifiers wished to abolish equitable
servitudes is less certain. Supporting the conclusion that they in-
tended to retain equitable servitudes is their citation of two Cali-
fornia cases holding that if an owner purchased land with notice of
a covenant that did not run, the covenant would bind the land (al-
though not the owner) in equity.1 1 9
On the other hand, there are important factors arguing for eq-
uitable servitude abolition in Montana, and if those factors are de-
cisive, those two cases might have been cited for another of their
propositions: That horizontal privity was necessary to the running
of a covenant. Among the considerations militating for equitable
servitude abolition in Montana are the clear language of the Code
provisions themselves, the absence of any provision for equitable
servitudes, the fact that equitable servitude doctrine did not rest
comfortably within the Code scheme, and the Montana codifiers'
stated distaste for judicial discretion. Additionally, the codifiers
deleted an annotation in the California Civil Code preserving equi-
table servitudes from the Montana version. 20 Thus, although the
matter is far from certain, the weight of the evidence is that the
Montana code commissioners did intend to abolish equitable
servitudes.
In two respects, the Montana drafters probably intended that
their text be construed differently from the way Mr. Field would
have construed it. The texts themselves are virtually identical, but
the difference in understanding is apparent from a reading of two
cases selected for the Montana annotations but absent from the
117. MONT. CIv. CODE § 1984 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-202 (1989)).
Apparently, such rules represent an attempt to balance the freedom to encumber property
with the policy of promoting unrestricted use of land.
118. In their annotation to § 692 of the Civil Code, the New York codifiers adopted
the aberrant case of Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834), which
denied equitable enforcement of covenants that did not run at law. The New York codifiers
noted, only to reject, the equitable servitude cases of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41
Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) and Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862).
119. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53 (1889); Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 P. 275 (1889). See also supra Part II.
120. The annotation to the CAL. CIv. CODE § 1461 (1872) contains a provision indicat-
ing that equitable servitudes were outside the scope of that section. The section limits run-
ning covenants to those that meet the prerequisites enumerated in the Code. The analogous
Montana Provision, MONT. CIv. CODE § 1984 (1895), has no annotation.
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New York annotations. The first of these cases is Barrow v. Rich-
ard,121 which adopted the rule that equitable servitudes can be in-
ferred from a common plan of development. The citation of Bar-
row under section 1985 of their Code, the section that contains the
rule that a covenant be "contained in a grant," suggests that the
phrase "contained in a grant" should be construed to permit infer-
ence from the circumstances in which the grant is made-in other
words, that express wording in a deed or in a formal agreement is
not necessary.
The second case, Winfield v. Henning, 22 also was cited under
Section 1985. That section further contains the requirement that a
covenant be for the "direct benefit" of the transferred property.
Winfield sustained a covenant scheme in which lots owned in fee
simple absolute were subject to reciprocal burdens and benefits.
Thus, the inclusion of Winfield implies that under the Montana
Code a tract conveyed in fee simple absolute may be subjected to a
burden if it receives a benefit also. 23
B. Subject Matter of Covenants Under the Code
By recognizing covenants running with the land, the Civil
Code offered parties the freedom to regulate land use in ways
outside the scope of the permissible servitudes. The wide variety of
permissible covenants is not obvious from a casual reading of the
Code. The first section dealing with the subject matter of cove-
nants is as follows:
The only covenants which run with the land are those specified in
this part and those which are incidental thereto.' 24
The annotations to the original Field Code indicate that "those
[covenants] which are incidental thereto" does not mean "inciden-
tal" to the land; it means incidental to other authorized covenants.
The example provided by the annotators is a promise to stand
surety for a lessee's performance of a covenant to pay rent. 2 '
121. 8 Paige 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840). The evidence on whether Field himself favored in-
ference from a common plan is not conclusive. In his annotation to § 692 he disapproves
Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862), which inferred a covenant from a com-
mon plan. But he also disapproved Heriot's Hosp. v. Gibson, 2 Dow. 301, 3 Eng. Rep. 873
(H.L. 1814), in which the court refused to infer a covenant from a representation on a pro-
motional map.
122. 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870).
123. See also infra Part IV(E).
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-202 (1989). This wording is substantially identical to
N.Y. CIv. CODE § 692 (the original Field Code) and MONT. CIv. CODE § 1984 (1895).
125. ANNOTATION, N.Y. CIv. CODE § 692 (1865). The case cited is Allen v. Culver, 3
Denio 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).
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Following that section are two provisions itemizing those cove-
nants that may run:
(1) Every covenant contained in a grant of an estate in real
property, which is made for the direct benefit of the property or
some part of it then in existence, runs with the land.
(2) Subsection (1) includes covenants of warranty, for quiet
enjoyment, or for further assurance on the part of the grantor and
covenants for the payment of rent or of taxes or assessments
upon the land on the part of a grantee. 126
Although subsection (2) as written appears to be an exclusive
list-and, indeed, it does contain an exclusive list of running title
covenants127-the annotation suggests that the Code authorizes
any covenant whose subject matter can serve "the direct benefit of
the property.""12 The annotation sets forth, by way of illustration,
several cases in which covenants other than those in subsection (2)
were found to run. 29
Thus, the statutory sections reproduced above did not limit
the subject matter of enforceable running covenants, so long as the
creators complied with required formalities and any covenants
were made "for the direct benefit" of the transferred property.
C. Vertical Privity Under the Code
Under the Code, any person in possession of the servient es-
tate was bound by the terms of a servitude. There were more re-
strictions on the enforcement of covenants. This was one way of
compensating for the greater subject-matter flexibility of
covenants.
The Code adopted a strict common law vertical privity stan-
dard for the running of the burden of a covenant:
A covenant running with the land binds only those who acquire
the whole estate of the covenantor in some part of the
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203 (1989). This wording is substantially identical to
N.Y. CIv. CODE §§ 693, 694 and MONT. CIv. CODE §§ 1985, 1986 (1895).
127. That is to say, the covenants of warranty, quiet enjoyment, and further assurance
do run, but the covenants of seisin, against incumbrances, and right to convey do not. Sol-
berg v. Robinson, 34 S.D. 55, 147 N.W. 87 (1914) (construing an identical section of the
Field Code in South Dakota). This section codifies the common law rule. See also ANNOTA-
TION, N.Y. CIV. CODE § 694 (the predecessor to subsection (2)).
128. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 693 (1).
129. ANNOTATION, N.Y. CIv. CODE § 693 (1865). Among the cases listed are Denman v.
Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) (covenants for first use of water power and to
share dam maintenance expenses held to run); Verplanck v. Wright, 23 Wend. 506 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1840) (covenant not to cut timber); and Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1837) (covenant not to lease to other mahogany mills on stream).
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property."' 0
As has been noted earlier,13 1 the effect of the vertical privity rule is
to bind purchasers of the fee simple and assignees of a leasehold
and to make direct enforcement impossible against sublessees and
adverse possessors, and perhaps impossible against buyers at fore-
closure sales.132 If a party does not purchase the covenator's "en-
tire estate," that party is bound only if he has expressly assumed
the burden of the covenant-and then on a privity of contract the-
ory rather than by reason of privity of estate.
Another section codifying common law vertical privity rules is
the following:
No one, merely by reason of having acquired an estate subject to
a covenant running with the land, is liable for a breach of the
covenant before he acquired the estate or after he has parted with
it or ceased to enjoy its benefits.'33
The following illustrations demonstrate the operation of this
section:
Illustration # 1: Landlord leases property to T-1. T-1 covenants
to pay rent. T-1 assigns to T-2 who assigns to T-3. After the as-
signment to T-2, no one pays rent to Landlord. Landlord has not
released anyone from paying rent and neither T-2 nor T-3 explic-
itly assumed the rent obligation to Landlord.
By operation of this section, Landlord has a contractual rela-
tionship with T-1 and may collect all the rent from T-1 if the
latter is solvent. However, Landlord is no longer in privity of es-
tate with T-1. Landlord was never in privity of contract with T-2
or T-3. During the period of T-2's and T-3's respective posses-
sions, Landlord was in privity of estate with each and may collect
from each the rent accruing during their possessions. But T-2 is
not liable for rent accruing before the first assignment nor after
the second, and T-3 is liable only for rent accruing after the as-
signment to him.
Illustration # 2: Able purchases a lot in a subdivision governed
by a property owners association that collects monthly assess-
ments. Able sells to Baker. Baker is not personally responsible for
assessments accruing before or after the period of his
130. MONT. CIV. CODE § 1988 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-204 (1989)).
131. See supra Part 11(B).
132. Yet this section had no Montana annotations, and the only references in the New
York annotations were to sublessees.
133. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 697; MONT. CIv. CODE § 1989 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-17-205 (1989)).
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ownership.1 3 4
D. Horizontal Privity Under the Code
The Code required that all running covenants be "contained
in grants of estates in real property." Estates in real property in-
cluded both possessory estates and servitudes.13 5 The Field Code's
conformity with the horizontal privity requirement was consistent
with the New York law at the time. As one commentator observed,
"no state is more careful to require the covenants to accompany
some kind of grant than New York.'
' 3
The Field Code defined a "grant" as a transfer in writing,37 so
a good argument could be made that the Code drafters intended
that in order to run, a covenant would have to be set forth in the
instrument of conveyance. However, neither the New York nor the
Montana drafters probably intended to be quite that strict. The
common law permitted a covenant to be located in another docu-
ment executed at the time of the grant, and although the Code
changed the common law in some respects, there is little indication
that a change was intended here. On the contrary, several cases
cited in the New York annotations sustained the enforceability of
covenants contained in separate instruments, 38 and there is even
134. This illustration disregards the effect of statutory law, contract liens, and equita-
ble servitudes, where applicable.
135. The original MONT. CIV. CODE defined Title II of Part II of Division II as "Estates
in Real Property." Chapter 1 of Title II set forth the estates in land by duration (fee, life
estate, leasehold). Chapter 3 listed "Servitudes." See MONT. CIV. CODE §§ 1210 to -60 (1895).
Cf. N.Y. Civ. CODE §§ 218-55 (1865). Thus, the codifiers adopted the generally recognized
position that incorporeal hereditaments (which include easements and profits), as well as
possessory interests, are estates in land and are held, according to their duration, in fee
simple, for life, and for years. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 852, 856-57, 861, 865 & 1142; 4
KENT, supra note 2, at 21-22; 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 8.22.
See also a case cited by the New York annotators, Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N.Y. 558
(1863), the court adopted, as an alternative ground for sustaining the covenant, that a cove-
nant could accompany an incorporeal hereditament.
On occasion, the Montana Supreme Court has overlooked the rule that incorporeal her-
editaments are estates in land and are subject to limitation as fee simple, life estate, or for
years. See, e.g., Park County Rod & Gun Club v. Montana, 163 Mont. 372, 517 P.2d 352
(1973) (making false distinction between an "easement" and a "fee simple"); see also infra
text accompanying notes 193-95.
136. SiMs, supra note 2, at 155.
137. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 464. Cf. MONT. CIV. CODE § 1451 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-1-507 (1989) ("A transfer in writing is called a grant or conveyance or bill of sale.
The term 'grant,' in this part, and the next two articles, includes all these instruments,
unless it is specifically applied to real property.").
138. Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb.
213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862). But the parties themselves still had to be grantor and grantee of a
simultaneous grant. Note that the grant requirement appears twice: first in MONT. CODE
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some evidence the New York drafters intended to permit the
courts to consider material extrinsic to the deed, lease, or covenant
in determining the terms and scope of the covenantor's promise.""
As noted earlier, the latter was certainly the intent of the Montana
drafters. " "
E. The Requirement of a Benefit on Transferred Land
Under the terms of the New York Civil Code a covenant could
not impose a burden upon land transferred in fee simple absolute.
That was the effect of the following provision, now Montana Code
Annotated section 70-17-203 (1):
Every covenant contained in a grant of an estate in real property,
which is made for the direct benefit of the property or some part
of it then in existence, runs with the land. 4 1
To understand the meaning of this section, one must distinguish
between conveyances of fees simple absolute and conveyances of
lesser estates. If a leasehold or life estate is conveyed and no re-
mainderman is named, the grantor retains a reversion. In that case,
any covenant benefiting either the reversioner or the holder of the
present possessory interest arguably benefits the land in which an
estate is granted, for both parties simultaneously have interests in
the same land. A similar analysis applies if the grantor conveys a
defeasible fee and retains a possibility of reverter or a right of
entry.
If, on the other hand, the grant is of property in fee simple
absolute, the grantor retains no future interest in the conveyed
property. In that event, because the Code requires that the
granted land be a dominant tenement, a covenant that imposes
only a burden upon the granted land does not run.
There are several pieces of evidence supporting this construc-
tion of the Field Code. The provision immediately following the
one just quoted 4 2 includes six illustrative covenants running with
the land. Three of these-the covenants of warranty, quiet enjoy-
ANN. § 70-17-201 (1989) and again in MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203(1) (1989).
139. Among the cases disapproved in the annotation to the N.Y. CIv. CODE § 692 is
Heriot's Hosp. v. Gibson, 2 Dow. 301, 3 Eng. Rep. 873 (H.L. 1814), which held that a prom-
ise could not be implied from the seller's exhibition of plans at the time of the sale.
140. See supra Part IV(A).
141. Id. (emphasis added). In the Field Code "property" is the thing which is the sub-
ject of ownership-here, the land. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-101 (1989). This is an example of
unsatisfactory use of terminology in the Field Code. As I indicate in the text immediately
following, what Mr. Field meant was "direct benefit of the estate."
142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203(2) (1989).
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ment, and further assurance-are covenants that benefit a fee sim-
ple estate. The other three-rent, taxes, and assessments-were
imposed in Field's time either on leaseholds or (in the case of
rents) on fees simple subject to conditions subsequent.14 More-
over, of the ten cases cited in the annotation to this section, nine
deal with leasehold conveyances. The only one dealing with a fee
simple conveyance"44 involved a promise that benefited the
grantee.
In addition, there is a colorable reason why Mr. Field should
have prepared this section to prohibit covenants burdening estates
granted in fee simple absolute: he had to resolve a conflict in the
common law. In 1865 there was still some doubt in American law
as to whether a burden imposed on a granted estate would run
with the land when no tenurial relationship existed between the
grantor and grantee. Although the majority rule was that either a
burden or a benefit could run with the transferred land,1 45 the New
York courts were uncertain on the question and the English courts
had adopted the contrary view.1 46 In keeping with his restrictive
policy toward the running of covenants, Mr. Field elected to re-
solve the dispute by adopting the English rule.
The annotation to the original Montana Civil Code provision
suggests that with one alteration, the intent of the Montana
codifiers was the same as that of the New York codifiers.14 7 Of the
eight cases in their annotation, three involve leaseholds14 8 and two
others involve fee simple conveyances in which the grantor prom-
ised to bear some burden for the benefit of the transferred land.1 49
The remaining three cases suggest the difference between the in-
143. Only where the statute Quia emptores was no longer in effect and fee simple
ownership was deemed still tenurial could rent be imposed on a fee simple absolute. This
was the situation in Pennsylvania. SIMs, supra note 2, at 150-51. A series of New York cases
had existed involving reservations of perpetual rents in fee simple land grants by Stephen
Van Rensselaer, but in each case Mr. Van Rensselaer retained a right of entry. See, e.g., Van
Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N.Y. 558 (1863) (cited by the New York annotators) (right of re-
entry creates sufficient "tenurial" relationship to create privity of estate if tenurial relation-
ship necessary). See Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866), for a summary of
the extensive Van Rensselaer litigation.
144. Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
146. For New York see cases cited supra note 42. For the English view see RAWLE,
supra note 2, at 334-35. The English courts later decided that in absence of tenurial rela-
tionship neither the burden nor the benefit would run. SIMS, supra note 2, at 147-48.
147. ANNOTATIONS, MONT. CIv. CODE § 1985 (1895).
148. Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 663 (1858); Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep.
72 (K.B. 1583); Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
149. Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175 (1871); Easter v. Little Miami R.R., 14 Ohio St.
48 (1862).
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tent of the New York drafters and the intent of the Montana
drafters.3 0 Each of these cases considered subdivision restrictions.
All three validated restrictions burdening conveyed lots. But in all
three the covenants were of the kind commonly held to mutually
benefit both granted and reserved estates.' 5' Thus, the Montana
codifiers would sustain a restriction burdening granted land if it
were part of a scheme of covenants that benefited granted land as
well. 152
To summarize, the effect of this section of the Code appears to
be as follows:
1. If a covenant is in a lease or conveyance for life, the cove-
nant may run if the benefit accrues to either the present interest
(leasehold, life estate) or to the future interest (reversion, remain-
der). This rule probably also applies to covenants in grants of de-
feasible fees, in which the transferor retains or grants a future
interest.
2. If the covenant is in a conveyance in which there is no fu-
ture interest-that is, of a fee simple absolute-some benefit must
accrue to the granted land. The covenant may benefit both the
granted and retained land, but any promise that benefits only the
retained land does not run.
F. The Requirement that the Burden "Touch and Concern"
The drafters did not codify explicitly the common law rule
that the burden of a covenant had to "touch and concern" the ser-
vient estate in order to run.15 3 Indeed, the failure to refer expressly
to the common law doctrine is puzzling, and may have been an
instance of inadvertent omission-just the sort of situation in
which Mr. Field suggested recourse to the pre-Code law.
Whatever the reason for the omission, it is probable that the
codifiers intended to retain the "touch and concern" requirement.
Given their restrictive position on running covenants, it is unlikely
150. St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871); Barrow v. Richard, 8
Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); Winfield v. Henning, 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870).
151. The mutual benefit is mentioned explicitly in Winfield, 21 N.J. Eq. at 190.
152. See also supra Part IV(A). If one subscribes to the theory that equitable servi-
tudes were accepted by the Montana codifiers, all three cases could be dismissed as of no
importance to real covenants because in all three equitable relief was sought. Moreover, in
one of these cases, Winfield, both parties conceded that the covenant ran, thereby obviating
any need for judicial determination on that point.
The interpretation adopted herein is supported by subsequent California decisions. Los
Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902); Marra v. Aetna Constr.
Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
153. See supra Part II(B).
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that they intended to validate burdens that had nothing to do with
the use or enjoyment of servient land.154 Furthermore, both the
New York and Montana drafters annotated their codes with cases
in which the touch and concern test or similar standards had been
favorably noted or applied.15
G. Designation of Assigns
Both the New York and Montana Civil Codes repeated the
common law requirement that if the subject of the covenant was
not in existence at the time of contracting, "assigns" had to be
mentioned for the burden of a covenant to run. 156 Specifically, the
Code stated that a "covenant for the addition of some new thing to
real property or for the direct benefit of some part of the property
not then in existence or annexed thereto ... runs with the land so
far as the assigns thus mentioned are concerned.
1 57
H. Apportionment of Burdens and Benefits
The Code contained the following provision:
Where several persons holding by several titles are subject to the
burden or entitled to the benefits of a covenant running with the
land, it must be apportioned among them according to the value
of the property subject to it held by them respectively if such
value can be ascertained and, if not, then according to their re-
spective interests in point of quantity.15
The original Field Code annotations indicate that this section
154. The covenants for title represent an exception to this rule, essentially for histori-
cal reasons.
155. E.g., Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, 148 (1837) (cited by New York annotators)
("touch or concern"); Jourdain v. Wilson, 4 B. & Ald. 266, 106 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1821)
(cited by New York annotators) ("a covenant which respects the premises demised and the
manner of enjoyment"); Van Rensselaer v. Smith, 27 Barb. 104 at 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1858)
(cited by New York annotators) ("affects the land, although not directly to be performed on
it, provided it tends to increase or diminish its value in the hands of the holder"); Laffan v.
Naglee, 9 Cal. 663, 678 (1858) (cited by Montana annotators) ("touch or concern"); Easter v.
Little Miami R.R., 14 Ohio St. 48, 51 (1862) (cited by Montana annotators)("if it affected
the nature, quality or value of the thing demised. . . or if it affected the mode of enjoying it
.... .).
Subsequent to adoption of the Code, at least one California case has applied the "touch
and concern" test, but that case was decided under a later addition to the original Field
Code provisions. Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 58 Cal. App. 3d 506, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32
(1976). Montana has no such addition.
156. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
157. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 695; MONT. CIV. CODE § 1987 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-17-203(3) (1989)).
158. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 698; MONT. CIV. CODE § 1990 (1895) (currently MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-17-206 (1989)).
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reflected the results of the Van Rensselaer land grant cases, in
which the New York courts had held purchasers of portions of Van
Rensselaer grants liable for their pro rata shares of reserved
rent. 159 The Montana drafters did not annotate this section
further.
V. THE LAW OF THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT
A. Introduction to the Cases
This Part V consists of a review of the relevant case law issued
by the state supreme court in the years since the enactment of the
Montana Civil Code of 1895. The organization follows that of Part
IV. This organization was adopted in part to reflect the chronologi-
cal development of one of the few consistent themes of the
cases-the invention, growth, and corrosive power of the Montana
"negative easement."
B. Subject Matter of Running Covenants
In Part IV of this article, I observed that although the
codifiers intended to constrict the subject matter of easements and
servitudes in gross, they did not so limit the subject matter of run-
ning covenants. The Montana Supreme Court has never held
squarely that covenants other than those listed in the statute may
be created,16 but its decisions have had that effect. Disregarding
for the moment those cases that may be seen as equitable servi-
tude decisions and (perhaps) outside the scope of the Code, we can
list the following covenants as expressly or impliedly validated:
agreements for oil and gas bonus payments,"' restrictions barring
commercial use, 62 agreements not to challenge a particular kind of
use, 1 3 business non-competition covenants,' " restrictions limiting
159. Van Rensselaer v. Bradley, 3 Denio 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Van Rensselaer's
Ex'rs v. Gallup, 5 Denio 454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (each cited in the Field Code annotation).
See also Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb. 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1855).
160. The North Dakota Supreme Court, construing an identical provision, has so held.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. McClure, 9 N.D. 73, 81 N.W. 52 (1899).
161. Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1935).
162. Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965); Haggerty v. Gallatin County,
221 Mont. 109, 717 P.2d 550 (1986). See also State ex rel. Region II Child & Family Servs.,
Inc. v. District Court, 187 Mont. 126, 609 P.2d 245 (1980) and Porter v. K & S Partnership,
- Mont. -, 627 P.2d 836 (1981), each of which assumed that covenants restricting subdi-
vision to single-family use were valid.
163. Reichert v. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980).
164. O'Neill v. Ferraro, 182 Mont. 214, 596 P.2d 197 (1979) (competing restaurant on
landlord's premises enjoined); Haggerty, 221 Mont. at 109, 717 P.2d at 550 (restaurant). In
Burgess v. Shiplet, 230 Mont. 387, 750 P.2d 460 (1988), a covenant by a developer to estab-
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the kind of improvements that can be placed on a lot"6 5 or subject-
ing proposed improvements to architectural review,'66 and cove-
nants prohibiting livestock entirely167 or when they would be a
"nuisance. ' ' 6s
C. Vertical Privity in the Cases
In the realm of leasehold conveyances, the Montana Supreme
Court's vertical privity doctrine has been consistent and wholly or-
thodox. Generally, the court has held that the assignee of a lessee
is in privity of estate with the lessor and that a subtenant is not.
This has the effect of rendering an assignee, but not a subtenant,
liable on running covenants in the absence of contractual privity.'6"
If contractual privity exists between a landlord and an assignee or
subtenant, liability may be predicated on that ground.170 In addi-
tion, while privity of contract survives between a landlord and his
original lessee, the lessee stands surety for the assignee.' 7'
By virtue of the "whole estate" rule, it would seem that the
purchaser under a contract for deed, 72 who has only an equitable
interest in the property, is not bound by covenants running with
the land unless he has specifically assumed them. There have been
at least two cases in which purchasers on contracts for deeds alleg-
edly violated existing covenants. 73 However, the report of neither
lish a property owners association was assumed to be valid.
165. Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970) (trailer); Sheridan v.
Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383, 523 P.2d 1392 (1974) (roadway); Higdem v. Whitham, 167 Mont.
201, 536 P.2d 1185 (1975) (construction of garage allowed as permitted by covenants); De-
Laurentis v. Vainio, 169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976) (trailers and mobile homes).
166. Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983). The gen-
eral principle was acknowledged in Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489,
740 P.2d 668 (1987), although the specific application was invalidated.
167. Kelly v. Lovejoy, 172 Mont. 516, 565 P.2d 321 (1977) (court held, however, cove-
nant had been waived).
168. Gosnay, 205 Mont. at 221, 666 P.2d at 1247.
169. For the dominant law in the United States, see 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.5. For
the Montana law, see Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487 (1965); Herigstad v.
Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1935); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-204 (1989).
Cf. O'Neill v. Ferraro, 182 Mont. 214, 596 P.2d 197 (1979) (subtenant apparently had as-
sumed the obligations of the lease).
170. Herigstad, 101 Mont. at 22, 52 P.2d at 171. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-
205 (1989).
171. Kintner, 146 Mont. at 461, 408 P.2d at 487.
172. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-204 (1989). A "contract for deed" is known in other
parts of the country as a long-term installment land contract.
173. Reinke v. Biegel, 185 Mont. 31, 604 P.2d 315 (1979); VanUden v. Henricksen, 189
Mont. 164, 615 P.2d 220 (1980). In Burgess v. Shiplet, 230 Mont. 387, 750 P.2d 460 (1988),
the grantee claimed the benefit of the existing covenants, but the suit was against the origi-
nal covenantor. The grantee lost on other grounds.
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case gives any indication that the purchaser claimed the protection
of the "whole estate" rule. At any rate, in each instance it was at
least arguable that the purchaser had assumed the burden of the
covenants, and was therefore in privity of contract with the person
seeking to enforce them. The court ultimately decided both cases,
however, on other grounds.
Vertical privity rules are also relevant when the burdened es-
tate has been purchased at a foreclosure sale. At the time of codifi-
cation the courts were split on whether the purchaser of a servient
tenement at a foreclosure sale acquired a new title and took free of
such covenants or acquired the prior owner's title and took subject
to them. 174
The most important Montana vertical privity case arose in a
foreclosure context. In Northwestern Improvement Co. v.
Lowry,75 the plaintiff was the developer of the town of Paradise.
In the course of its sales campaign, the plaintiff conveyed a lot to
Linden, who, along with many others, covenanted in his deed not
to use the lot for the sale of alcoholic beverages. After the taxes fell
into arrears the county foreclosed and sold the lot to one Hauge.
Hauge later conveyed to the defendant, who opened a tavern on
the premises.
Under the tax sale statute of the time, a tax deed conveyed
"absolute title 'free from all incumbrances' ,,17' and the defendant
argued that the restrictive covenant did not survive the sale. There
is no indication that the parties cited or the court considered the
"whole estate" rule.
Because Northwestern was a case of first impression in Mon-
tana, the justices could have validated the covenant by following
the line of authority holding that real covenants survive foreclo-
sure. In other words, the court could have ruled that such a cove-
nant was not an "incumbrance" within the meaning of the statute
because the value of real covenants is taxed to their dominant
rather than to their servient estates.177 Instead, the justices first
noted that under the common law easements survived a tax sale of
174. See supra Part I(B).
175. 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937).
176. Id. at 301, 66 P.2d at 794.
177. This has been the thrust of several important cases, often decided on the analogy
of easements appurtenant. See, e.g., Crane-Berkley Corp. v. Lavis, 238 A.D. 124, 263 N.Y.S.
556 (1933); Tualatin Dev. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Or. 323, 473 P.2d 660 (1970);
Waterville Estates Ass'n v. Town of Campton, 122 N.H. 506, 446 A.2d 1167 (1982); Locke
Lake Colony Ass'n v. Town of Barnstead, 126 N.H. 136, 489 A.2d 120 (1985); Borough of
Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super. 514, 174 A.2d 631 (App. Div. 1961). See
also Payne, Condominiums and the Ancient Estates in Land: New Context for Old Learn-
ing, 14 REAL EST. L. J. 291, 298-301 (1986).
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the servient estate and then proceeded to characterize the "no-al-
cohol" rule as a negative easement.
If Montana had been a pure common law jurisdiction, such
creativity would have been understandable, perhaps laudable. But
the effect of the Northwestern decision in Montana was to under-
mine the scheme of the Civil Code. It has already been observed
that the Code's listing of easements is designed to be exhaustive,"' a
and although the Code authorizes some negative easements, 179 it
says nothing of negative easements prohibiting the sale of alcohol.
To be sure, the court correctly observed that the Code permits the
creation of easements allowing the "right of transacting business
upon land,"18 but it is a ncn sequitur to suggest, as the court did,
that this justifies creation of an easement to prevent transaction of
a particular business upon land. Thus, the Code's list of permissi-
ble servitudes thereupon ceased to be a reliable one.
It can be argued that the Northwestern court's "negative ease-
ment" doctrine is merely equitable servitude theory in another
guise-indeed, equitable servitudes sometimes are equated with
equitable or spurious easements."'1 Moreover, there is some, al-
though not decisive, historical justification for assuming that equi-
table servitudes survived the Montana codification.182 However,
the supreme court did not rest negative easement doctrine on equi-
table servitude grounds, nor has it done so in any subsequent nega-
tive easement case.
The Northwestern court turned to the general common law for
support for its negative easement theory, but found only Spartan
comfort there-and with good reason, for at common law no such
easement exists.1 3 It appears, therefore, that the Montana nega-
178. See supra Part IV(A).
179. E.g., easements of air, light, and heat. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101(8) (1989).
180. Northwestern, 104 Mont. at 301, 66 P.2d at 794.
181. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, at 487.
182. See supra Part III(A).
183. The number of true negative easements is fairly limited, which, as noted above, is
one reason equitable servitude principles were developed. See supra Part II(C). Compare 2
ALP, supra note 2, at 373 which reads as follows:
Whenever a covenant imposes purely negative duties upon the covenantor, it is
possible for the court to construe the covenant as the grant of an easement, and
thus avoid the necessity of privity of estate between the parties. This possibility
seems to be limited to those covenants where the character of the negative duties
fit into one of the recognized types of negative easements ....
The Northwestern opinion is objectionable for another reason. An easement is an incor-
poreal hereditament, and as such should be created by grant or reservation, i.e., by deed
rather than by contract. At the time of the Northwestern case this rule was better under-
stood than it is now. BEHAN, supra note 2, at 45. In fact the misunderstanding of how ease-
ments are created is now so widespread that in Kuhlman v. Rivera, 216 Mont. 353, 701 P.2d
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tive easement is purely a creation of local common law, and a crea-
tion entirely inconsistent with the Code.
The court could have redeemed itself in Rist v. Toole
County, " but it failed to do so. In Rist, the court considered
whether an oil royalty survived a sale for delinquent taxes. The
dissenting judge argued that the royalty agreement was a covenant
running with the land; he seemed to think that running covenants
should survive foreclosure. Had he carried a majority with him, the
Northwestern case would have been explainable as merely an
adoption of the rule that covenants do survive foreclosure. How-
ever, the majority held that the royalty agreement did not rise to
the level of a separately taxable interest in land, although the ma-
jority did not deny the dissent's contention that it was a running
covenant. 185 The net effect of Rist was to place Montana among
those states in which a covenant does not survive foreclo-
sure-unless counsel can convince the court to construe the cove-
nant as a negative easement.186
982 (1985), Justice Sheehy had to remind counsel that an easement could be created by a
naked grant in absence of a contract! See also Burlingame v. Marjerrison, 204 Mont. 464,
469, 665 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1983).
When the parties purport to create an easement by contract, the courts often effectuate
their intent, especially if the contract contains words of grant. However, this should in fact
be the intent of the parties. The Northwestern covenant is devoid of any evidence the par-
ties intended to create an easement (although they did create a reversionary interest).
A good analogy to the process of finding a grant in a contract is afforded by those cases
that, in determining whether a contract is also a lease, consider whether the document con-
tains "words of demise" or other evidence of intent to convey. Annotation, Farmland Culti-
vation Arrangement as Creating Status of Landlord-Tenant or Landowner-Cropper, 95
A.L.R. 3d 1013, 1018 (1979); see also White v. Saby, 127 Mont. 241, 260 P.2d 1116 (1953).
184. 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945).
185. The dissent also relied on the common law to argue that the royalty was a profit a
prendre, but did not mention MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-101 to -112 (1989), which govern
profits and other servitudes. Actually, at common law a royalty is neither a profit nor a
running covenant but a kind of incorporeal hereditament called a rent. Freehold rents, like
easements and profits, are real property interests. One distinguished commentator has in
fact criticized the Rist court for failing to identify a royalty as a rent, and therefore as a real
property interest. Sullivan, A Survey of Oil & Gas Law in Montana as it Relates to the Oil
& Gas Lease, 16 MONT. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1955) [hereinafter Sullivan].
The matter is controlled, however, not by common law but by the Field Code statutes.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203(2) (1989) classifies a rent (and therefore a royalty) as a cove-
nant running with the land. MONT. CODE ANN. §70-17-102(4) indicates that a rent also can
be a "servitude." It is symptomatic that neither the Rist court, nor the dissent, nor the
commentator, identified the applicable statutes.
186. Counsel may have an easier time of this if the covenant at issue is restrictive
rather than affirmative in nature. For another example of different treatment of affirmative
and restrictive covenants, see infra Part V(E).
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D. Horizontal Privity in the Cases
Unlike California, which has amended its Civil Code largely to
abolish the horizontal privity doctrine, Montana still retains the
rule that covenants must be contained in grants of estates in
land.1 87 The history of the Montana case law in this area is the
story of one attempt after another to avoid the effect of the hori-
zontal privity rule.
Much of this evasion can be justified from the legislative his-
tory of the Code. For example, the codifiers themselves probably
intended that the term "grants" be construed to include docu-
ments outside the deed or lease itself.' as From this point of view,
the Montana Supreme Court has acted properly in holding that
recorded covenants are incorporated in a deed by reference 8' and
that the terms of the covenants can be gleaned from all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the grant.' 90 Moreover, because the
codifiers considered "estates in land" to include servitudes,' 9 ' it
was proper for the court to construe a covenant between neighbors
creating access rights as an easement of way-one of the easements
authorized by the Code. In that case, the covenant was "contained
in a grant" because it was itself a grant. 9 '
In a similar vein is Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co.,'9 3 in which
187. The California legislature felt the need to do so, despite judicial adoption of the
equitable servitude doctrine. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1468 (West 1982). It initially adopted its
amendment in 1905. The language has since been altered and now reads in part as follows:
Each covenant, made by an owner of land with the owner of other land or made
by a grantor of land with the grantee of land conveyed, or made by the grantee of
land conveyed with the grantor thereof, to do or refrain from doing some act on
his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the
land of the covenantee, runs with both the land owned by or granted to the cove-
nantor and the land owned by or granted to the covenantee and shall ... benefit
or be binding upon each successive owner ....
Id.
There are a few restrictions on operation of this provision, so the horizontal privity require-
ment may survive in some constricted areas.
188. See supra Part IV(D).
189. Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965). The doctrine has been fol-
lowed consistently. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383, 523 P.2d 1392 (1974).
190. E.g., Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965)
(architectural plans, floor plans, brochures, form contracts, a description and outline of
specifications, the architect's drawing, an informational pamphlet, oral representations, and
the deed were all taken into account). See also Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc., 619 Mont. 1194, 619
P.2d 1194 (1980).
191. See supra Part IV(D). See also Hill v. City of Huron, 39 S.D. 530, 165 N.W. 534
(1917) (the horizontal privity requirement of the SOUTH DAKOTA FIELD CODE was satisfied by
construing a party wall covenant creating a party wall easement authorized by the servitude
portion of the CODE).
192. Johnson v. Meiers, 118 Mont. 258, 164 P.2d 1012 (1946).
193. 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1935).
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the Montana bench was faced with the fact that a bonus term in
an oil operating agreement did not appear to accompany the grant
of an estate in real property. The court ruled, nevertheless, that
there was horizontal privity and the bonus term was a covenant
running with the land. The court reasoned that a federal prospect-
ing permit (the basis of the covenantor's rights) was the functional
equivalent of an oil or gas lease and an operating agreement was
the functional equivalent of an assignment. Because an oil and gas
lease was an incorporeal hereditament-presumably a profit a
prendre-the transfer of such a lease was a grant.'94
Although the foregoing reasoning seems sound, the justices
confused matters by stating that an oil and gas lease is not an es-
tate in land.'95 Because the "grant" required by the Code is a grant
of an "estate in land," a statement that an oil and gas lease is not
an estate in land undermines the court's ratio decidendi. But the
court's errors cancelled each other out; as we have seen, under the
Code transfer of a servitude is in fact a grant of an estate in
land. '9
In most jurisdictions, the traditional way of avoiding the hori-
zontal privity requirement is by recourse to the equitable servitude
doctrine. 97 However, the only horizontal privity decision in which
the court was to adopt equitable servitude principles was Orchard
Homes Ditch Co. v. Snavely,1' 8 which, technically, was not an equi-
table servitude case at all.
In Orchard Homes the plaintiff ditch company had agreed to
supply water at a certain price to the lot of one Beagles. Beagles
conveyed to the defendant Snavely who in turn conveyed to the
defendant Noland who conveyed to the defendant-appellant
Saulter. Because neither Snavely nor Noland nor Saulter had paid
their water bills, plaintiff sued all three.
The water-supply contract was not a covenant that ran with
the land, for it was not contained in a grant. It did not provide
that the water was to be an appurtenance to the land nor that the
194. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101(5) (1989). For the status of the oil and gas lease in
Montana as a profit a prendre, see Sullivan, supra note 185, at 5-7.
195. The opinion refers to an oil or gas lease as a "so-called 'lease'" that "does not
vest in the lessee an estate in the land or in the oil and gas therein." Herigstad, 101 Mont.
at 33-34, 52 P.2d at 174.
196. See supra Part IV(D).
197. The (indecisive) authority for survival of equitable servitudes after the 1895 Code
is set forth supra Part IV(A). In a number of other cases, notably Thisted v. Country Club
Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965), the court referred to the covenants in-
v6lved as equitable servitudes, but they were in fact valid covenants running with the land
at law. In none of the foregoing cases had the court employed equitable servitude principles.
198. 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945).
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land was to serve as security for payment for the water. Because
the covenant did not run with the land and because none of the
defendants was a covenanting party, properly speaking, none of
the defendants was personally liable.' 99
The supply of water to the defendants' lot had increased the
value of that lot enormously-from $100 to $1500. The case was a
perfect opportunity for the court to impose a purely restitutionary
equitable lien, and that is exactly what occurred in the trial court.
The result of the trial court's order was a charge upon the lot for
the full amount due, including the amounts unpaid by Snavely and
Noland, who no longer had an interest in the property. Saulter,
then in possession, agreed to pay her share, but objected to imposi-
tion of a lien on her property for her predecessors' debts.
Saulter appealed, but the supreme court affirmed. In doing so,
it relied upon three California water-supply decisions, two of which
had been cited as illustrative by the Montana codifiers.200 Each
case was distinguishable from Orchard Homes because in each
there was a contract (albeit not in a grant) explicitly binding the
land in question, a contract that justified a finding that an equita-
ble servitude had been affixed to the property.
In Orchard Homes the lack of a contract term binding the lot
disqualified the agreement as a valid equitable servitude, but the
court was on firm jurisprudential ground in imposing a purely
restitutionary equitable lien. Without horizontal privity such a lien
binds the land only and does not justify imposing personal liability
on the current landowner, but a charge on the land alone usually is
sufficient to effectuate payment of a debt.20 1
Reichert v. Weeden was the decision that inflicted the greatest
damage upon the Code's horizontal privity rule.20 2 In Reichert, the
plaintiffs owned property on which they operated a restaurant. In
1969, the plaintiffs applied for a liquor license to which the defend-
ants, neighboring landowners, objected. In the midst of legal pro-
ceedings on the subject, the parties entered into a stipulation in
which the defendants consented to judgment against them and
plaintiffs covenanted not to sell beer or liquor after January 1,
1981. The stipulation provided that it would run with the land, but
no grant accompanied it.
199. The trial court did issue judgments against all three. If these imposed personal
liability, the judgments against Snavely and Noland must have proved uncollectible.
200. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53 (1889); Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 P. 275 (1889); Fresno Canal & Irrigation
Co. v. Park, 129 Cal. 437, 62 P. 87 (1900). Dunbar is discussed supra Part II(C).
201. Supra Part II(C).
202. 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980).
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In 1979, the plaintiffs sued to have the agreement declared
void and unenforceable. The court probably could have employed
its equitable powers to dismiss the action, for certainly it could
have justified a finding of estoppel. Instead, however, the court de-
cided the case on its merits. The court held that the stipulation
ran with the land by virtue of the "negative easement" doctrine,
first adopted in Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry'0 3 and
now roused from a well-deserved sleep of 42 years.
A thorough reading of Reichert is a disappointing exercise for
those of us who admire the Montana Supreme Court." 4 Yet I must
excerpt enough of the opinion to afford the flavor of it, for Reich-
ert demonstrates, as much as any other decision, both the corrosive
power of the negative easement doctrine and the inventiveness of
judges who feel compelled to disregard a clear statutory mandate.
Reichert also suggests how out-of-place that statutory mandate,
based on New York common law, is in the courts of Montana.10 5
The opinion characterized the plaintiffs' argument thus:
[P]laintiffs... contends [sic] that a "grant" of an estate is a stat-
utory requirement for the creation of a covenant running with the
land, and since defendant did not grant an interest of the land to
plaintiffs, the agreement is not enforceable.2 0 6
The court then quoted the statutes on point. As this article has
demonstrated, those statutes indicate that the plaintiffs were abso-
lutely correct: the covenant did not run with the land. Neverthe-
less, the court avoided the obvious by trivializing plaintiffs' conten-
tion that formalities governed the case:
Plaintiffs insist that no covenant runs with the land and will not
be binding unless certain words are contained in the document.
Since those words are not found in this document, they maintain
that no grant of an estate in real property took place .... We
disagree.2 7
The opinion then proceeded to a non sequitur argument, and
one in which the conclusion assumed what had not been proven:
Plaintiffs were aware of their actions, and their intent was clear.
203. 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937).
204. Past events compel me to state the obvious: However presumptuous it may be for
one who has never been a judge to scrutinize judicial performance, such scrutiny is part of a
law professor's job. Even when the conclusions are rejected, judges and lawyers often find
critical analysis useful in subsequent cases.
205. For some conclusions on the inappropriateness of imposing a New York code on
Montana, see infra Part VI.
206. Reichert, 190 Mont. at 99, 618 P.2d at 1219.
207. Id.
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Not only did they grant away a present interest, but also a future
interest that will bind their heirs and assigns. " '
Having thus revealed that it did not understand the definition of
"future interest," the court proceeded:
This interest in the land is the right to sell liquor or operate a bar
on the land after a particular date. Plaintiffs . .. gave away an
interest in the land by creating a negative easement binding not
only themselves, but their heirs and assigns.2"9
The court's circularity of reasoning reminds one of Bronson v. Cof-
fin,210 decided many years before-a case that also served to
weaken the horizontal privity rule. The circle is as follows: (1) This
is a valid covenant, (2) a valid covenant grants an interest in the
servient land, (3) this covenant grants an interest in the servient
land, (4) therefore this covenant is a grant, (5) therefore this cove-
nant is "contained in a grant," and therefore, (6) the covenant is
valid. 1'
The court then went on to cite the negative easement holding
in Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, failing to mention
however that in that case, the covenant had been contained in a
grant; 1 2 noted the irrelevant point that the Code authorized ease-
ments to conduct business on land; confused the definition of
''conveyance" in the recording statute with the term "grant" in the
covenant statute;213 and capped its effort by lifting out of context a
quotation from Orchard Homes Ditch Co. v. Snavely.2"
208. Id. at 99-100, 618 P.2d at 1219.
209. Id. at 100, 618 P.2d at 1219.
210. 108 Mass. 175 (1871).
211. Bronson is discussed supra Part II(B).
In addition to the circularity of this argument, another problem is the leap from Step
(4) to Step (5): It does not follow that because a covenant is a grant, it is therefore con-
tained in a grant.
Cf. Hill v. City of Huron, 39 S.D. 530, 165 N.W. 534 (1917). In Hill, the South Dakota
Supreme Court, construing its Field Code horizontal privity requirement, held that the re-
quirement was met when adjoining landowners covenanted to erect and maintain a party
wall. The court held that one effect of the covenant was to create a party wall easement, and
the creation of the easement was a sufficient grant to support the remainder of the cove-
nant. Note, however, that (1) unlike the Montana negative easement, party wall easements
are recognized explicitly in the Code, (2) the creation of easements by covenant without
words of grant, while irregular, is supported by extensive precedent, and (3) there was more
to the covenant in Hill than the mere creation of the easement, so it was arguable that the
remainder of the covenant was "contained in" the grant.
For the party wall provision in Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101(12) (1987).
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-101(13) (1989).
212. See supra Part V(C).
213. Misapplying Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965) in the process.
214. 190 Mont. at 101, 618 P.2d at 1220. The part of the Orchard Homes decision
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Reichert is currently the last word on the subject of horizontal
privity. At the present time, therefore, the surviving force of the
doctrine in Montana is at most as follows:
1. Horizontal privity is no longer a requirement for purely re-
strictive covenants to run with the land.
2. Horizontal privity may or may not be a requirement for af-
firmative covenants to run with the land.215
3. The courts may or may not impose personal liability upon
other assets of landowners who disregard covenants made between
predecessors in interest who were not in horizontal privity.
E. The Requirement of a Benefit on Transferred Land and the
"Common Plan or Scheme"
I have observed already that the original Field Code prohib-
ited the running of covenants that imposed burdens on estates
conveyed in fee simple absolute. I have also noted that the annota-
tors of the Montana Civil Code apparently accepted covenants that
burdened conveyed land if the covenants benefited both that land
and the grantor's retained property. 16 The classic example of the
latter situation is the conveyance of lots in a subdivision pursuant
to a common plan.217
When it was decided in 1986, Haggerty v. Gallatin County218
seemed to largely eliminate the rule that covenants must benefit
transferred fees simple absolute. In Haggerty, the supreme court
validated a promise not to sell beer or wine on transferred land by
characterizing the promise as a negative easement:
There is additional authority and precedent for not voiding the
commercial use restriction. Montana statutes allow for the crea-
tion of covenants and easements governing the right to transact
business on land. [Montana Code Annotated section 70-17-101(6)
(1985)]. Montana recognizes negative easements. A properly cre-
ated negative easement can be utilized to restrain the right to do
excerpted implies that covenants will be enforced fully without horizontal orivity. In fact,
that decision imposed only a lien, not personal liability, upon the defendant. See Orchard
Homes Ditch Co., 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945). See also supra Part V(D).
215. The distinction between restrictive and affirmative covenants in this respect
draws force from the differing treatment of the two in Northwestern Improvement Co. v.
Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937), and Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159
P.2d 340 (1945). See also infra Part V(E).
216. Part IV(E), supra.
217. Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 222-23, 404 P.2d 894, 897 (1965). Examples of
other cases sustaining subdivision covenants, include Sheridan v. Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383,
523 P.2d 1392 (1974); Higdem v. Whitham, 167 Mont. 201, 536 P.2d 1185 (1975); Gosnay v.
Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983).
218. 221 Mont. 109, 717 P.2d 550 (1986).
1990]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
business on a piece of property and such easements are not auto-
matically void.2"9
Just when it appeared that the negative easement had de-
voured another statutory barrier, however, the court called it back
to its cage. It did so only a year after Haggerty, in Town & Coun-
try Estates Association v. Slater.22
Town & Country was a small residential subdivision in Bill-
ings in which the Slaters had purchased a lot. The Slaters decided
to construct a house on their land and, pursuant to the recorded
covenants, they sought architectural approval for their plans from
the Design Review Committee of the governing property owners
association. The committee disapproved the plans, finding that the
proposed dwelling was not, in the words of the covenants, in "har-
mony of external design." The Slaters began construction anyway.
The property owners association successfully sought an injunction
in district court and the Slaters appealed.
The facts of the case indicate that among the 16 existing
homes in the subdivision there was no "harmony of external de-
sign," for that portion of the restrictions requiring architectural
consistency had never been enforced. Arguably, the high court's
best course would have been to vacate the injunction on the
grounds that the restrictions had been waived or were impossible
to realize.221
The court did vacate the injunction, but elected to offer sev-
eral alternative grounds for reversal. 22 One of those grounds was,
in effect, the mutual benefit rule:
Each purchaser in a restricted subdivision is both subjected
to the burden and entitled to the benefit of a restrictive covenant.
Generally, these covenants are valid if they tend to maintain or
enhance the character of a particular residential subdivision.
However, such covenants are enforceable only when used in con-
nection with some general plan or scheme....
... In view of the wide variety of designs, no one seemed bur-
219. Id. at 119, 717 P.2d at 556 (citing Reichert v. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d
1216 (1980)).
220. 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987).
221. A court will not enforce a covenant if conditions in or around the subdivision
have so changed that the original purpose of the servitude cannot be realized. Similarly, the
covenant will not be enforced if it has been waived by non-enforcement. The doctrine of
estoppel is employed to similar effect. See infra Part V(L).
222. For further discussion of the opinion in Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater,
227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 671 (1987), see infra Part V(K).
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dened by the covenant except the Slaters.22 s
One way to reconcile Haggerty and Slater is on the basis that
Haggerty involved a purely restrictive covenant of the kind that
can be characterized as a "negative easement" while Slater con-
strued covenants that imposed certain (contingent) affirmative ob-
ligations-specifically the need to apply to a committee for design
approval. Two of the vertical privity cases discussed ear-
lier-Northwestern and Rist-can be reconciled by a similar
analysis.2 4
The Slater court stated that mutual benefit covenants "are
enforceable only when used in connection with some general plan
or scheme." '225 It will be necessary to examine the common scheme
concept before proceeding further.
The common plan or scheme is a recurring motif in covenant
cases. It refers to the developer's "original intent"-his initial idea
of what the completed subdivision will look like, an idea conceived
before any lot is sold. Most subdivisions are constructed in accor-
dance with such a plan, but a common plan is by no means a pre-
requisite to the enforcement of all covenants-or even to the en-
forcement of all subdivision "mutual benefit" covenants. On this
point, the language of the Slater court was misleading.
There are several types of cases in which judges must deter-
mine whether the developer had a common scheme and, if so, what
the nature of that scheme was. One type of common scheme case
arises when the terms and scope of the governing covenants are not
expressed fully in one set of documents. In those circumstances, a
judge may examine extrinsic evidence of the developer's
plan-evidence such as that found in maps, documents, oral repre-
sentations, and the physical layout of the property-in order to
piece together the terms and scope of the covenants.226
In another type of common scheme case the scheme may assist
in determining whether a property purchaser had notice of existing
covenants. For example, the physical appearance of a well-planned
residential community may, when coupled with other factors, serve
as notice to purchasers of lots that their lots were restricted to res-
idential purposes.22 Similarly, the presence in a subdivision of ex-
223. Slater, 227 Mont. at 492, 740 P.2d at 671.
224. See supra Part V(C). Of course, any dio :,iction may have been unintentional on
the part of the supreme court.
225. Slater, 227 Mont. at 492, 740 P.2d at 671.
226. See, e.g., Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432
(1965).
227. This was unsuccessfully maintained in Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc., 190 Mont. 172,
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tensive and well-manicured common grounds may suggest to a pro-
spective property buyer that the developer's plan is for a property
owners association to collect assessments for the upkeep of those
grounds.228
A third type of common scheme case arises when the identity
of the dominant estate is not certain. Only the owners of benefited
land have standing to sue for breach of a covenant. Moreover, in
most jurisdictions all covenants must benefit some land: a cove-
nant whose benefit is held in gross is invalid.229 In Montana, prop-
erty conveyed in fee simple absolute must derive some advantage
for a covenant to be valid;2 30 the common plan can help determine
whether this requirement has been met.
For example, in Slater the covenants burdened all the lots in
the subdivision. If the covenants had not also benefited those lots,
all of the covenants-and not just the particular architectural pro-
vision at issue-would have been void. The common scheme pro-
vided evidence that the subdivision was a mutual benefit
community.
It does not follow that an initial common scheme is always
necessary to the validity of burdens on granted lots. Consider the
following illustration.
Illustration # 3: Builder subdivides a tract of land into 30 par-
cels. He sells Lots 1-10 without restrictions. He sells Lots 11-20
619 P.2d 1194 (1980). See infra Part V(J). See also Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall, Inc., 367
Mass. 355, 325 N.E.2d 572 (1975); Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
228. See, e.g., Sea Gate Ass'n v. Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
229. See supra note 28. On use of a scheme to determine the dominant estate, see also
Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971) (no scheme
found); Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935) (scheme found); Chimney
Hill Owners' Ass'n v. Antignani, 136 Vt. 446, 392 A.2d 423 (1978) (no scheme found). See
also Winfield v. Henning, 21 N.J. Eq. 188 (1870) (cited by the drafters under the MONT. CIV.
CODE § 1985 (1895)).
230. Outside of the three Field Code states that have not amended the relevant cove-
nant rule (Montana and the Dakotas), a pure burden may run on property conveyed in fee
simple absolute. Thus, in most states it is necessary only that the covenant benefit some
dominant estate. See generally 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 9.8nn (recognizing no distinction
between cases in which the grantor has the sole burden and cases in which the grantee has
the sole burden). California has amended its Civil Code to adopt the majority rule for most
purposes. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1468 (West 1982).
And yet Professor Krasnowiecki would argue that mutual benefit can be important
outside of Montana and the Dakotas:
When several landowners expect to share equally in the benefits and burdens of a
covenant and that expectation is disappointed, so that some have the benefits but
not the burdens whereas others have to carry an extra burden, the courts are apt
to find that the covenants are not enforceable, at least if the majority of those who
have the unexpected burdens so desire.
Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
711, 720 (1975).
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with affirmative covenants imposing an assessment to maintain a
common area. These covenants are purportedly for the benefit of
all lots in the subdivision. He sells Lots 21-30 with restrictive cov-
enants against any but residential use. These restrictions also are
purportedly for the benefit of all parcels in the subdivision.
In the foregoing example, it is evident that Builder did not
establish a common plan at the outset-at least not one to which
he adhered. In many jurisdictions, moreover, the courts would not
grant Lots 1-10 the benefit of either the restrictive or the affirma-
tive covenants and would not concede to Lots 1-20 the benefit of
the residential restrictions. Granting a benefit to a parcel already
conveyed out is seen as a violation of the "no reservation of an
easement in a stranger" rule.231
Even if the benefit of subsequent covenants cannot be at-
tached to earlier conveyed lots, however, there is not one burdened
parcel in this subdivision that does not also benefit from those cov-
enants. Lots 1-10 are not burdened at all. Lots 11-20 can enforce
the assessment restriction against each other. Lots 21-30 can en-
force the residential restriction against each other and the assess-
ment covenants against Lots 11-20.
The Supreme Court of Montana says it follows the "no reser-
vation in a stranger" rule, although it makes exceptions when the
intent to reserve in a stranger is clearly shown.232 But the court has
overlooked a statute that explicitly abolishes the rule in most
instances:
A present interest and the benefit of a condition or covenant re-
specting property may be taken by any natural person under a
grant although not named a party thereto.233
By virtue of that provision, all lots purchased by natural persons
are benefited by subsequently-restricted parcels if the developer so
intends.
Despite the language of Slater, therefore, in Montana it is not
a prerequisite to covenant validity that a developer have an initial
plan or scheme. The proof required is that the covenant meets the
231. Snow, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224.
232. Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437, 603 P.2d 669 (1979).
233. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-521 (1989) (formerly MONT. CIV. CODE § 1492 (1895), and
originally developed as the N.Y. CIv. CODE § 482). There are a substantial number of Mon-
tana cases on "reservation in a stranger," but to my knowledge none has ever mentioned the
statute. It is probable most lawyers are unaware of it.
The statute was designed expressly to change the common law rule. See N.Y. CIv. CODE
at 144 (1865). It also reflected the results of cases such as Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch.
351 (N.Y. Ch. 1840), cited by the Montana annotators.
1990]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
requirements of the statute, and it is an indifferent question
whether this proof is made by reference to a scheme or in some
other manner.
From the foregoing, it appears that at the present time the law
on the benefit and burden of Montana covenants is as follows:
1. Covenants running with the land may benefit or burden ei-
ther the granted or retained estate when the conveyance is of an
estate less than fee simple absolute.
2. Purely restrictive covenants ("negative easements") may
benefit or burden estates held in fee simple absolute, whether
granted, retained, or, after Reichert v. Weeden, owned
concurrently.
3. Affirmative covenants may burden land retained when es-
tates are granted in fee simple absolute, but affirmative covenants
may burden conveyed land only when they also benefit the con-
veyed land.
4. A common plan or scheme is a permissible, although not a
required, method of demonstrating which properties receive bene-
fits from a particular covenant or set of covenants.
F. The Requirement that the Burden "Touch and Concern"
As far as I have been able to determine, the Montana bench
has not treated, and a fortiori not altered, the common law rule
that the burden of covenants must "touch and concern" the land.
As indicated in Section A of this Part V, the subjects of covenants
sustained are all within the common law tradition.
G. Designation of Assigns and Intent that the Covenant Run
Like other English and American tribunals, the Montana Su-
preme Court looks to the intent of the parties in determining
whether a covenant runs with the land.234 When the covenant is in
a lease, does not concern a thing not in esse, and is of the type that
normally would run, the court may presume that the parties in-
tended that the covenant would bind and benefit their assigns.
This presumption is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary.2 35
H. Apportionment of Burdens and Benefits in the Cases
The most significant Montana apportionment case is Weintz
234. Reichert v. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980); Weintz v. Bumgarner,
150 Mont. 306, 434 P.2d 712 (1967).
235. Weintz, 150 Mont. at 315-16, 434 P.2d at 717-18.
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v. Bumgarner,a8 in which a tenant for years sought to enforce a
pre-emptive right against the heirs of the lessor. The heirs argued
that the tenant's pre-emptive right was never triggered, because all
of them had not formed a simultaneous intent to sell. The court's
response:
Upon the death of the owner and lessor ... title to the property
... passed immediately to his heirs as tenants in common. The
purchase provision in the lease, being a "covenant that runs with
the land," is apportioned among the heirs according to their re-
spective interests in the whole of the property and binds them in
the same manner as if they had personally entered into the cove-
nant....
Thus the burden of the purchase provision of the lease
passed by operation of law to the heirs as owners of undivided
interests in the whole of the property who became individually
and separately bound to the extent of their respective interests.
Upon formation of a specific intention by each heir to sell the
whole of his individual interest in the property, plaintiff's right of
purchase according to the terms of the lease vested and accrued
as to the interest of each such heir without regard to the interests
of other heirs.23 7
To the apportionment rule, the court has recognized an excep-
tion: when a plaintiff is only one of several beneficiaries of a
scheme of covenants running with the land and the only way to
afford the plaintiff complete relief is to enjoin the defendant to
honor the entire scheme, the injunction will be granted even if
other potential claimants are benefited incidentally.3 8
I. Notice
There are two reasons why notice is important in cases involv-
ing covenants and other burdens upon land: Notice may result in
236. 150 Mont. 306, 434 P.2d 712 (1967).
237. Id. at 316-17, 434 P.2d at 718.
238. Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965) (a prop-
erty owners association case). In Thisted, the court stated:
It appears clear that if any one of the apartment owners (here being Mrs. Roberts)
who is in privity, under the facts and circumstances here, with the corporate de-
fendant and has a right to relief, it would bind the defendants as to the whole
building, because it would be impossible to segregate the use of the building or
apportion its use among the apartment owners.
Id. at 99, 405 P.2d at 438.
The same is not true when the relief sought is for damages. See Natelson, Mending the
Social Compact: Expectancy Damages for Common Property Defects in Condominiums
and Other Planned Communities, 66 OR. L. REV. 109, 130-49 (1987).
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the creation of such burdens239 and notice may result in the sur-
vival of previously-existing burdens after the servient tenement
has changed ownership.2 40
In cases of this nature, notice arises in one of three contexts:
(1) mere filing pursuant to the provisions of the recording act;24 1
(2) circumstances suggesting the existence of unrecorded inter-
ests-circumstances such as the property's physical condition,242
the existence of documents, the making of representations, or some
combination thereof;243 and (3) recording coupled with other
events that impress upon a person the existence of the public
record.244
The Montana Supreme Court seems reluctant to bind pur-
chasers of real estate to land burdens by reason of constructive no-
tice alone. The Montana court insists that there be the kind of
evidence that would alert even a careless purchaser to the exis-
tence of the covenants.
The recording statutes provide that proper filing in the office
of the county clerk and recorder constitutes constructive notice to
subsequent land purchasers. Yet there is no reported covenant case
in which the court held a landowner liable by reason of the public
record alone.245 In Kosel v. Stone,24 several grantors had conveyed
239. E.g., Pioneer Mining Co. v. Bannack Gold Mining Co., 60 Mont. 254, 198 P. 748
(1921) (easement); Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d 812 (1963) (easement);
Thisted, 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (easements and covenants); Majers v. Shining Moun-
tains, 219 Mont. 366, 711 P.2d 1375 (1986) (easements); Town & Country Estates Ass'n v.
Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987) (covenants).
240. Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965) (survival of covenants binding
predecessor in title); Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc., 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194 (1980) (implied
covenants held not to survive).
241. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-21-302 (1989).
242. Pioneer, 60 Mont. 254, 198 P. 748; Spaeth, 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d 812; Graham
v. Mack, 216 Mont. 165, 699 P.2d 590 (1985).
243. Thisted, 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432. This is a role for proof of the "common plan
or scheme." See supra Part V(E).
244. Kosel, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965); Sheridan v. Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383,
523 P.2d 1392 (1974); Majers v. Shining Mountains, 219 Mont. 366, 711 P.2d 1375 (1986);
Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987); VanUden v.
Hendricksen, 189 Mont. 164, 615 P.2d 220 (1980); Goeres, 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194
(1980).
The subject of notice, even notice in real estate transactions alone, ranges well beyond
the realm of covenants running with the land. Unfortunately, a definitive treatment of Mon-
tana notice law has not been written, and such a treatment is outside the scope of this
article. The general observation that follows is based solely upon the covenant cases and a
few closely-allied easement cases.
245. See Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc., 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194 (1980), in which the
plaintiffs claimed the defendant's lot was restricted. The court passed over the first recorded
deed from the common grantor, despite the fact that it purported to restrict the defendant's
lot. The court took more seriously a later deed that restricted another lot but that did not
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land to a corporation developing a residential subdivision, and in
the course of doing so had filed a "declaration of restrictions" gov-
erning the subdivision. The court concluded that the declaration
was a "conveyance" within the meaning of the applicable statute 47
and therefore a recordable document, and that it had been filed in
a timely manner. But the court also observed that the deed to the
defendant's predecessor in interest referred to the declaration, that
the defendant's deed referred to a filed subdivision plat, and that
the recorder's notation of the plat (presumably in the index) re-
ferred to the declaration of restrictions.
Similarly, in Sheridan v. Martinsen,4 8 the court's decision
emphasized that the defendant had knowledge of the recorded re-
strictions. In several other cases the justices took pains to observe
that the defendant's deed or contract had referenced the restric-
tions involved.24
Even when the circumstances provide a mixture of record and
inquiry notice, the Montana court is more hesitant to bind a servi-
ent landowner than are the tribunals of other jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that
a purchaser in a planned subdivision who has no covenants in his
deed is on notice of covenants between the common grantor and
prior grantees of other lots, even though those covenants are set
forth only in the deeds to other lots.2 50 The Michigan Supreme
Court has ruled that a purchaser without covenants in his own
deed can be placed on notice of "reciprocal negative easements" by
the condition of the neighborhood.2 51 This position has been
adopted in other states as well.252 Cases of this nature should be
contrasted with the Montana Supreme Court's holding in Goeres v.
Lindey's, Inc. 53
In Goeres, the defendant had purchased Lot #3 in a subdivi-
sion in which most of the other lots were restricted to residential
purposes. There were no restrictions in prior deeds to Lot #3, how-
ever; and on that basis the defendant proceeded to construct a res-
purport to bind the defendant's property. But the later restricted deed had appeared in the
defendant's title commitment; the former had not.
246. 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965).
247. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-21-301 (1989).
248. 164 Mont. 383, 523 P.2d 1392 (1974).
249. Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987)
(covenants incorporated by reference in deed); VanUden v. Hendricksen, 189 Mont. 164, 615
P.2d 220 (1980) (earnest money contract and contract for deed).
250. Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall, Inc., 367 Mass. 355, 325 N.E.2d 572 (1975).
251. Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
252. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, at 495.
253. 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194 (1980).
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taurant on the property. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin construction.
The general common law afforded the plaintiffs at least two
grounds for arguing that Lot #3 was subject to the same covenants
that bound most of the rest of the subdivision. In the common
grantor's first deed (which conveyed seven other parcels, but not
Lot #3) the grantor had agreed to restrictions on most of its re-
tained land, including Lot #3. Under the Massachusetts rule, this
would have the effect of binding Lot #3. Moreover, the common
grantor later conveyed 51 lots (including Lots #3 and 42) to its
corporate principals, who sold Lot 42 subject to restrictions. Under
the Michigan rule, this would create a reciprocal covenant on their
retained land, including Lot #3. To complement the foregoing, the
plaintiffs introduced evidence that the subdivision had a uniform
residential appearance, a decisive fact in states such as Massachu-
setts and Michigan. The trial judge held this evidence afforded the
defendant adequate notice of the restrictions upon Lot #3 and en-
joined further construction.
The opinion of the supreme court suggested several reasons
for reversing the trial judge, but ultimately only one was
important:
By holding that appellant is not bound by the restrictive cov-
enant as to commercial use, we do not also find that said cove-
nant does not exist at all as to the subdivision at issue. We merely
hold that to enforce these implied restrictions so as to be applica-
ble to a particular transfer of land it is necessary to show knowl-
edge of the restrictions by the transferee at the time of purchase
and that enforcement of the implied restrictions will not be
inequitable.2 5
One way to explain the decision in Goeres is to conclude that
Montana has joined the group of states that hold that the chain of
title to one parcel of land does not include deeds to other parcels
of land, even from a common grantor.255 The knowledge of a servi-
ent owner, however, is a common theme of Montana cases in this
area, even when the covenants at issue clearly are within the servi-
ent owner's chain of title .256 Goeres stands, then, as another exam-
ple of the Montana court's unwillingness to bind the grantees of
254. 190 Mont. at 179, 619 P.2d at 1198 (emphasis added).
255. 4 ALP, supra note 2, § 17.24.
256. Sheridan v. Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383, 388, 523 P.2d 1392, 1394-95 (1974) (court
emphasizes servient owner's knowledge of covenants); O'Neill v. Ferraro, 182 Mont. 214,
216, 596 P.2d 197, 198 (1979) (restriction in top lease reported to sublessees); Porter v. K &
S Partnership, - Mont. -, -, 627 P.2d 836, 838, 843 (1981) (majority and dissent split
on whether servient owners knew of restrictions).
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servient land to covenants unless prior to the transfer those grant-
ees had unmistakable evidence that the land was subject to those
covenants.
J. Implied Covenants
When a court "implies" an easement or a contract,257 it infers
an intention not directly expressed. The inference may be drawn
from the words of the parties (employed to express some intention
other than the creation of the easement or contract), from their
acts, from other circumstances or from some combination of all of
these."'8 The parties' testimony on their own intent as it existed at
the time the easement or contract was created is admissible evi-
dence of these circumstances, but it is by no means conclusive.2 9
Further, the intention inferred is not necessarily the actual inten-
tion of the parties. Quite often it is not. Frequently the parties
themselves never considered the subject-matter at all. Frequently
one or both of them were in ignorance of important facts. Fre-
quently, too, a party acts unreasonably or in bad faith-giving in-
dications that induce the other party to form expectations that he
does not mean to fulfill.2 60 In such cases the court inferring an in-
tention does not find a matter of fact. Instead it considers the par-
ties' acts, words, and the surrounding circumstances and extrapo-
lates a hypothetical intention that the parties would have formed
had they thought about the matter reasonably and in good faith.
The Montana Supreme Court calls this extrapolated, hypothetical
intention presumed intent.2 61
The Montana codifiers, and perhaps Mr. Field as well, ex-
pected a court to be able to consider various extrinsic facts and
circumstances in deciding whether a contract had been created,
what the contract's terms were, and whether or not it ran with the
257. The use of the word imply for "infer" is odd to modern ears. Like many other
legal terms, it is apparently a survival of an archaic usage once more general. In property
law, compare livery, determine, covenant, words of limitation. To imply once meant "to
involve, to wrap up in." An implied intent is one wrapped up in facts and circumstances. Cf.
the Latin implicare. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 1250
(Neilson 2d ed. 1955).
258. Pioneer Mining Co. v. Bannack Gold Mining Co., 60 Mont. 254, 198 P. 748
(1921); 2 ALP, supra note 2, § 8.31 (discussing implied easements). The other implied ease-
ment cases are instructive on the factors considered. See, e.g., Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont.
231, 383 P.2d 812 (1963) (easement by pre-existing use); Graham v. Mack, 216 Mont. 165,
699 P.2d 590 (1985) (same).
259. Graham, 216 Mont. 165, 699 P.2d 590.
260. Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965).
261. Graham, 216 Mont. at 173, 699 P.2d at 595.
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land.262 The Montana Supreme Court has performed this task well:
Indeed, it is within the area of implied covenants that the court
has performed some of its finest work.
Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp.2 e3 was a particularly dif-
ficult case, both because it involved one of the first horizontal
property regimes in the United States and because the documents
that had created the regime were incomplete. A developer named
Julius Peters constructed an 11-story building in Great Falls. His
development company transferred the building to a corporation
but reserved fee simple ownership of 20 of the 21 apartments in
the building. He then marketed the 20 reserved apartments to the
general public. The corporation owning the rest of the building (in-
cluding one apartment for the manager) issued 20 shares of stock,
one for each apartment owner.2 4
Peters' development company was able to sell only 10 of the
20 marketed units to the general public. His company retained
seven and conveyed one to him, one to his daughter, and a third to
another corporation controlled by him. At some point he conceived
the idea of converting at least some of the retained units to com-
mercial and transient use. Several other apartment owners, includ-
ing Roberts and Thisted, sued to enjoin the conversion.
Perhaps because Peters' attorney had used cooperative rather
than condominium documents as a model, in the conveyance of the
building-without-apartments from the development company to
the management corporation, no express covenants had been im-
posed on the property and no easements of access had been re-
served.2 5 The plaintiffs argued, however, that under the circum-
stances of the case, covenants restricting the building to residential
use should be implied.
The court agreed. It rejected the defendant-developer's con-
tention that any prior agreements were merged in the deeds to the
unit purchasers. In effect, the court inferred the parties' presumed
262. See supra Part IV(D). See also the statutory quotations in Thisted, 146 Mont. at
102-03, 405 P.2d at 440.
263. 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965).
264. The court variously characterized the building as a condominium and "in the
nature of a co-operative apartment." Id. at 88, 405 P.2d at 433. Actually it was neither. In a
condominium, the common elements are titled to all owners in common, not to the associa-
tion. In a cooperative, the entire building is titled to a corporation and individual apart-
ments are leased to the shareholders. For details, see NATELSON, POA, supra note 2, § 1.2.
265. I have not seen the documents, but condominiums either did not exist or were
exceedingly rare in the United States in 1957, the date of the conveyance. See Natelson,
Comments on the Historiography of Condominium: The Myth of Roman Origin, 12 OKLA.
CITY. U.L. REV. 17, 28-31 (1987).
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intention from the developer's initial common plan.26 6 In doing so,
it considered a wide range of documents and circumstances to ar-
rive at its determination. Among the documents were architectural
plans and floor plans, sales pamphlets, the developer's form con-
tract, a description and outline of specifications, and the deeds
themselves. To the extent that these documents suggested a use at
all, it was a residential use. They spoke in terms of "apartments,"
"gracious living," standards of selection, and so forth. The court
also considered certain oral representations made to the
purchasers.
Most telling was the physical condition of the building and the
defendant's failure to reserve easements of access to the apart-
ments. The court noted,
Such rights, if any are to exist at all, must be implied. By this
deed it is quite clear that there was created a separate ownership
* . . of twenty cubicles of air located within the outer confines of
the apartment building, and with all the structural portions of the
building owned by Management. A perfectly legal situation arose
from this transfer, but if we do not imply the additional use of
the structural portions of the building owned by Management the
owners of the apartments would not be able to get to them, heat
them, get lights, water and other utilities to them.26
In other words, the necessity for implying easements not set forth
in the individual deeds suggested that those deeds did not, as the
developers claimed, memorialize all the terms of the transactions.
Throughout the opinion, the court referred to the restrictions
implied by the circumstances as "equitable servitudes." Histori-
cally and within the context of the Thisted case (the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief), that was correct. Under the Montana ver-
sion of the Field Code, however, implication is an acceptable way
of ascertaining the existence and terms of all running covenants.
Moreover, on the Thisted facts there were horizontal and vertical
privity, benefited and burdened estates, and intent that the
promises run. These "equitable servitudes" qualified fully as cove-
nants running with the land.
In Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc.,26 8 the plaintiffs' counsel claimed
266. On the use of the common plan or scheme to prove the existence and terms of
covenants, see supra Part V(E).
267. Thisted, 146 Mont. at 100, 405 P.2d at 438. The court overruled Simonson v.
McDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957), which had held that 40 years of Montana
implied easement law was all wrong. A bizarre case in its conclusion, Simonson was also one
of the few attempts to apply genuine "displacement" style Code jurisprudence of the kind
Field advocated.
268. 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194 (1980). Additional discussion on this case appears
1990]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
that Thisted had adopted the doctrine of "reciprocal negative
easements" (i.e., reciprocal restrictive covenants). The court in
Goeres correctly rejected that contention. Reciprocal negative cov-
enants arise when a court infers from a common plan a grantor's
willingness to be bound by the same covenants that restrict the
grantees. There were no covenants inserted in the deeds in
Thisted, and the only representations in writing were by the devel-
oper, not the grantees.
But the Goeres court still was faced with the issue of whether
there should be reciprocal negative covenants in Montana. Al-
though the plaintiffs ultimately lost on notice grounds, the Goeres
opinion intimated that the court might very well recognize recipro-
cal negative covenants in a future case. The court suggested, how-
ever, that the future case should involve stronger facts than
Goeres: that there ought to be more than one or two restricted
deeds, that the restricted deeds ought to come from the common
grantor, and that the physical nature of the subdivision should be
such as to suggest clearly its controlled nature.269
The latest pronouncement involving implied covenants is
Majers v. Shining Mountains.27 0 A subdivision developer had filed
a plat showing a proposed street. The developer failed to pave the
street, and the lot purchasers sued to enforce what they claimed
was an implied covenant to pave. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiffs and the developer appealed. The
high court reversed.
The opinion acknowledged that presentation of a map to a
purchaser creates an implied promise that what is shown in the
map will be done. Thus, a map designating an area as a road cre-
ates an easement in favor of the lot purchasers.2 7 ' However, indica-
tion of an easement does not of itself demonstrate a promise to
improve the easement:
[T]he purchasers acquired an easement for the designated use.
Whether there is any legally enforceable right to have the roads
supra Part V(I).
269. Actually in Goeres there was a restricted deed from the common grantor. This
deed was the first from the common grantor, and it had conveyed seven lots. Moreover, the
deed expressly bound the defendant's lot. The court never explained satisfactorily why that
deed did not create restrictions on defendant's lot. The reasons may be two: (1) The initial
deed was "out of the defendant's chain of title," i.e., did not convey the defendant's lot and
(2) the Montana Supreme Court rarely holds parties liable based on deed recording alone.
See supra Part V(I).
270. 219 Mont. 366, 711 P.2d 1375 (1986).
271. Contra Heriot's Hosp. v. Gibson, 2 Dow. 301, 3 Eng. Rep. 873 (H.L. 1814) (disap-
proved in a Field annotation).
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constructed depends not on the designation in the plats but on
the use of those plats in inducing purchases. The instruments
alone do not give rise to a promise to open or construct the roads.
Factual issues remain on the use made of the plats and what rep-
resentations were made in the sale of lots.2"2
To summarize the court's point: the trial judge must consider all
the circumstances giving rise to the alleged covenant, and in this
case he had not yet done so.
K. Construction of Covenants
The Montana Supreme Court has been interpreting land cove-
nants on a regular basis for only a few years, and has not as yet
developed a principled method of interpretation. There is general
agreement that, although covenants are interests in land,7 3 they
are also contractual, and should be interpreted as contracts.27 Yet
the court seems uncertain of how it should apply the contract
standard.
Most judges across the nation agree that when a valid cove-
nant is clear and unambiguous, it ought to be applied as written.
The Montana court subscribes to that position.2 75 However, there
are two major schools of thought on the construction of terms with
uncertain meanings. One school maintains that ambiguities should,
if possible, be construed in accordance with the intent of the draft-
ers or of the grantors and grantees-that the covenants should be
interpreted to further the purposes of those parties.16 When the
272. Majers, 219 Mont. at 371-72, 711 P.2d at 1378.
273. Schara v. Anaconda Co., 187 Mont. 377, 610 P.2d 132 (1980). The more common
American view is that real covenants are contractual obligations only and not property in-
terests in the covenantor's land. Equitable servitudes sometimes are treated as property
interests and sometimes are not. 2 ALP, supra note 2, §§ 9.8 & 9.24.
274. Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970); Sheridan v. Martin-
sen, 164 Mont. 383, 523 P.2d 1392 (1974); Reinke v. Biegel, 185 Mont. 31, 604 P.2d 315
(1979); Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983).
275. Timmerman, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; Higdem v. Whitham, 167 Mont. 201,
536 P.2d 1185 (1975); Cieri v. Gorton, 179 Mont. 167, 587 P.2d 14 (1978). See also Kelly v.
Lovejoy, 172 Mont. 516, 565 P.2d 321 (1977) (interpreting "livestock" to include horses -
perhaps more unambiguous in Montana than in the East, where horses are more often pets).
276. Cases that apply the "pure intent" standard, without a presumption in favor of
free use of property include Highbaugh Enters., Inc. v. Deatrick & James Constr. Co., 554
S.W.2d 878 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Piechowski v. Case, 255 N.W.2d 72, 75 (S.D. 1977); Thodos
v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.2d 733 (1956); Joslin v. Pine River Dev. Corp., 116 N.H. 814,
367 A.2d 599, 601 (1976). See also Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637,
640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Constellation Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Harrington, 467 So.
2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc.,
685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (all of which apply the principles of "intent validation"
to substantive validity) and Perry v. Bridgetown Community Ass'n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230
(Miss. 1986) (apparently moving away from strict construction rule in a non-condominium
1990]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
intent and purposes are uncertain, the adherents of this position
maintain that the court can consider parol evidence 217 and/or that
it may consider the circumstances and pertinent facts surrounding
the execution of the documents and known to the parties.27
The other school of thought maintains that courts ought to
construe covenants strictly to further the public policy of the free
use of land. Under this precept, ambiguities are resolved against
the restriction of the burdened land. A New York trial court has
formulated the principle in this manner:
[T]he general policy of the law is toward the free and unrestricted
use of real property. The right of restricting property is granted
by law, but the restriction must be clearly and sharply defined.
Covenants will not be enlarged by construction.2 9
An Illinois tribunal has adopted an intermediate position: A
judge ought to apply the intent test as far as it can carry him,
covenanted subdivision).
The importance of subdivision purpose is emphasized in Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes,
Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Joslin, 116 N.H. at 817, 367 A.2d at 601; Fairwood
Greens Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Young, 26 Wash. App. 758, 614 P.2d 219, 221 (1980); and
Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 109 Ill. App. 3d 689, 65 Il. Dec. 248, 440 N.E.2d
1264 (Ill. App. 1982), aff'd, 99 Ill. 2d 182, 75 Ill. Dec. 667, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (1983).
277. Goldenfarb v. Land Design, Inc., 409 A.2d 662 (Me. 1979); Warren v. Detlefsen,
281 Ark. 196, 663 S.W.2d 710 (1984); Tropicana Club, Inc. v. James H. Topping, Inc., 502
So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
278. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974). The reconstruction of
intent can be shown by demonstration of a "common plan or scheme." See supra Part V(E).
279. Baxendale v. Property Owners Ass'n of North Shore Acres, 138 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 285 A.D. 1148, 140 N.Y.S.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955), aff'd,
309 N.Y. 871, 131 N.E.2d 287 (1955). Compare the dissent at the Appellate Division level,
arguing that the trial judge should have been reversed. The dissent would have applied pure
intent validation standards:
Reading these covenants together, their spirit, intent and context clearly prohibit
the use of plaintiffs' lot in North Shore Acres for a public highway. Any other
interpretation, in our opinion, would defeat the basic purpose and intent of the
restrictive covenants.
Baxendale, 285 A.D. at 1149, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 178 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Other out-of-state cases applying (or at least acknowledging) the strict construction rule
include Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306 (1929); Carranor Woods Property
Owners' Ass'n v. Driscoll, 106 Ohio App. 95, 153 N.E.2d 681 (1957); Watts v. Fritz, 29 Ill. 2d
517, 194 N.E.2d 276 (1963); Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); Johnson
v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975); Dickstein v. Williams, 93 Nev. 605, 571 P.2d
1169 (1977); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Current, 35 N.C. App. 135, 240
S.E.2d 503 (1978); Le Febvre v. Osterndorf, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 275 N.W.2d 154, 159 (1979);
Arthur v. Lake Tansi Village, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tenn. 1979); Fairwood Greens
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Young, 26 Wash. App. 758, 614 P.2d 219, 221-22 (1980); Beech
Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980); Snug
Harbor Property Owners Ass'n v. Curran, 55 N.C. App. 199, 284 S.E.2d 752 (1981), review
denied, 305 N.C. 302, 291 S.E.2d 151 (1982).
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turning to strict construction only as a last resort. s0
The Montana Supreme Court has not adopted any of these
positions with consistency. In the first modern decision on the sub-
ject, Timmerman v. Gabriel,281 the court had to determine whether
a mobile home was a "trailer" banned from a subdivision by the
covenants. The court determined that it was.
The result of Timmerman was the same as would have been
achieved if the court had construed the covenants liberally to ef-
fectuate their purpose. In Timmerman, that purpose was to regu-
late the appearance of structures within the subdivision, and the
mobile home was not consistent with the prevailing architecture.
The court's apparent methodology, however, was not that of liberal
construction. Rather than consider structural appearance, the
court searched for the essence of "trailerness"-which it deter-
mined to be mobility.
In another decision four years later, the court upheld a trial
judge's determination that a proposed use violated the "spirit"
(meaning, presumably, the purpose) of the restrictions.28 But a
year later, in 1975, the bench switched to the strict construction
rule, reversing an order for the removal of a garage.28s
Only 11 months later, the court determined that a "modular"
home was a "mobile" home, and therefore prohibited by the cove-
nants. The court mentioned neither the strict construction rule nor
the purpose of the subdivision; instead it relied upon a statutory
definition of "mobile home" enacted for an entirely different pur-
pose.2 84 The cases have continued to vary among themselves in
subsequent years.2 a5
280. E.g., Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 133 Ill. App. 3d 327, 478 N.E.2d 860
(1985):
The paramount rule for the interpretation of covenants is to expound them so as
to give effect to the actual intent of the parties as determined from the whole
document construed in connection with the circumstances surrounding its execu-
tion. (citations omitted) The rule of strict construction in favor of the free use of
property will not be applied to defeat the obvious purpose of a restriction, even if
not precisely expressed; before giving effect to the rule of strict construction,
courts will have recourse to every aid, rule or canon of construction so as to ascer-
tain the parties' intention.
Id. at 331-32, 478 N.E.2d at 863.
281. 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970).
282. Sheridan v. Martinsen, 164 Mont. 383, 523 P.2d 1392 (1974).
283. Higdem v. Whitham, 167 Mont. 201, 536 P.2d 1185 (1975).
284. DeLaurentis v. Vainio, 169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976).
285. O'Neill v. Ferraro, 182 Mont. 214, 596 P.2d 197 (1979) (upholding trial court in-
quiry into intent behind an ambiguous term); State ex rel. Region II Child & Family Servs.,
Inc. v. District Court, 187 Mont. 126, 609 P.2d 245 (1980) (setting forth strict construction
test but mixing it with the "intent" and "spirit" of the restrictions); Town & Country Es-
tates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987) (mixing strict construction rule
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One of the court's best decisions in this area is former Justice
Morrison's opinion in Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Association.2 86
The Gosnays had purchased a lot in a covenanted subdivision.
Under the terms of the covenants, they needed architectural com-
mittee approval before constructing improvements on their lots.
The Gosnays wished to construct a stable, but the committee de-
nied approval because their lot was one in which the covenants
prohibited stables. They also wished to construct a fence and to
introduce horses onto their lot. The committee deemed the Gos-
nays' lot unsuitable for both. In reviewing the committee's deter-
mination, the court applied a reasonableness standard:
The Committee's discretion to approve or disapprove a fence
must be governed by the prohibitive covenants and must be rea-
sonably exercised. To do otherwise would be an abuse of discre-
tion by the Committee .... The Architectural Committee did not
abuse its discretion when it refused Gosnays [sic] permission to
build their fence. Gosnays' fence is contrary to Big Sky's overall
plan for "openness." No other tract or lot in the subdivision is
totally enclosed by a fence....
... Stables are not allowed on tracts which are limited by the
covenants to single family residences and garages....
... Certainly we are unable to say that the Committee, in finding
unhoused horses to be a nuisance, abused its discretion as a mat-
ter of law.287
By adopting the reasonableness standard for the review of a
property owners association's decision, the court acted consistently
with the overwhelming bulk of American common law authority. It
also adopted a standard of judicial review of association actions
that has worked with great success in other jurisdictions for over
50 years.288
with a balancing test).
286. 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983).
287. Id. at 228-29, 666 P.2d at 1250-51.
288. The reasonableness test originated in Judge Lehman's brilliant opinion in
Drabinsky v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 239 N.Y. 321, 146 N.E. 614 (1925). Today, courts throughout
the country review ad hoc decisions, and other association actions, by employing a system I
call the "Fourfold Standard of Validity." See generally, NATELSON, POA, supra note 2, chs.
4-5.
Under the Fourfold Standard, an association that imposes a special assessment, consid-
ers a plan of architectural change, enforces a use restriction, or makes any other kind'of ad
hoc decision must do so in compliance with the following:
(1) The decision must be made in good faith to further a purpose of the subdivision
(generally reflected in the declaration, bylaws, or other rules promulgated pursuant thereto).
Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969) (application of architectural
restriction); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
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The court's opinion in the earlier-discussed case of Town &
Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater,289 is somewhat less helpful. The
result is correct, but the reasons given are multitudinous and un-
clear. The court "recognize[d] that aesthetic considerations have a
place in prior approval covenants, and that there are no absolute
standards to guide a committee's judgment and taste," but that
"[tihe approval or disapproval of plans.., must be based upon an
objective design standard." ' The court held that the standards at
issue were "vague" and therefore denied "substantive due process"
to the Slaters.291 Additionally, the opinion stated that ambiguities
in covenants "are to be construed to allow free use of the prop-
erty" '292 but that "the free use of the property must be balanced
against the rights of the other purchasers .... ,,113 Perhaps what the
court meant is that the variety of architectural styles in the subdi-
(1981) (disapproval of proposed purchasers); Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983) (application of architectural restriction).
(2) The decision must be a reasonable means of accomplishing that purpose. When the
requirements of good faith purpose and reasonableness are stated in the negative, it is said
that the decision cannot be arbitrary and capricious. Rhue, 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (appli-
cation of architectural restriction); Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258
Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975) (regular assessments); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (application of architectural restriction);
Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (disapproval of prospective pur-
chasers); Laguna Royale, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (disapproval of prospec-
tive purchasers); Chateau Village North Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1982) (pet approval); Cohan v. Riverside Park Place Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 123
Mich. App. 743, 333 N.W.2d 574 (1983) (application of architectural restriction); Cohen, 142
Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983) (application of architectural restriction); Amoco
Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 133 Ill. App. 3d 327, 478 N.E.2d 860, 864-65 (1985) (application
of architectural restriction); Ironwood Owners Ass'n IX v. Solomon, 178 Cal. App. 3d 765,
224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1986) (application of architectural restriction). For a detailed analysis of
the "reasonableness" requirement, see Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness"
in Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. -
(1990).
(3) The decision must be consistent with the POA's governing regulations. Rywalt v.
Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condomin-
ium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (special assessment);
Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Hurley, J., dissenting) (ap-
proval of prospective purchasers); Chateau Village, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (pet
approval); Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1981) (architectural review decision ex-
ceeded scope of servitudes).
(4) The decision must be consistent with public policy.
If an association decision violates any of the foregoing requirements, it is held to be
unenforceable.
289. 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987). See supra Part V(E).
290. Id. at 492-93, 740 P.2d at 671.
291. Id. at 493, 740 P.2d at 671 (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 492, 740 P.2d at 671 (quoting State ex rel. Region II Child & Family Ser-
vices, Inc. v. District Court, 187 Mont. 126, 130, 609 P.2d 245, 248 (1980)).
293. Id. at 492, 740 P.2d at 671.
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vision made compliance with architectural standards impossible,
and that the application of impossible standards imposed rules of
which the Slaters had received no notice before purchasing their
property.
L. Termination and Amendment of Covenants
The Field Code had nothing to say on how land covenants are
terminated. This may be the sort of inadvertent omission which
Field suggested ought to be cured by reference to pre-existing com-
mon law.294
There have been very few cases on termination of covenants in
Montana. It appears, however, that the court will be moving con-
sistently with the courts of the other states on the question-that
is, that termination may occur through waiver, estoppel, or
changed conditions.
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right.295 Unlike estoppel, which requires reliance by the
party claiming it,298 waiver is essentially unilateral in charac-
ter-the only behavior required is that of the person waiving. De-
spite the distinction, in Kelly v. Love joy297 the Montana Supreme
Court held that a couple purchasing land in a subdivision with
knowledge that the defendants were violating the covenants "ac-
quiesced" in the violations, and that this acquiescence "constituted
a waiver and [the couple were] therefore estopped from asserting
the restrictive covenant against" the defendants.""
The Kelly case not only confounds the waiver and estoppel
doctrines, it raises another unanswered question: Is a person who
purchases a lot in a subdivision knowing that a neighbor is engag-
ing in an unpermitted use, automatically barred from seeking re-
lief from the use? Despite the language of Kelly, the answer to this
question may be "no," for in Kelly one of the plaintiffs specifically
testified that he had "acquiesced" in the violation before suing.299
294. See supra text accompanying note 92. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109
(1989).
295. Kelly v. Lovejoy, 172 Mont. 516, 565 P.2d 321 (1977).
296. See generally United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir.
1970), and in the setting of covenants, Arthur v. Lake Tansi Village, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 923,
930 (Tenn. 1979); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 559. Compare the "selective
and arbitrary enforcement" doctrine applied by the Florida courts, e.g., White Egret Condo-
minium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), which may or may not be a version of
estoppel.
297. 172 Mont. 516, 565 P.2d 321 (1977).
298. Id. at 520, 565 P.2d at 323-24.
299. Id. at 519, 565 P.2d at 323.
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Moreover, there was evidence that the action was brought primar-
ily for spite.
The "changed conditions" ground for covenant termination
appears in instructions to the trial court in Porter v. K & S Part-
nership.300 There the supreme court stated:
The authorities agree, however, that where the restricted area has
changed so radically over the years such that the purpose and in-
tent of the restrictions are totally defeated, then equity cannot
enforce the restrictions. The change must be so radical and per-
manent as to neutralize the benefits of the restrictions....
At the trial on the merits, the District Court should consider
the effect on the subdivision of changes inside and outside the
specific restricted area .... The above-cited authorities do state,
however, that greater weight should be given to changes inside
the boundary of the restricted area than to changes in neighbor-
ing areas.301
This is essentially a correct statement of the rule, except that I
would maintain that the last sentence is true only if conditions in-
side the boundary in fact have had a greater disruptive effect than
those outside."'°
The justification for the "changed conditions" doctrine may be
summarized as follows:
(1) A covenant has as its purpose the benefit of a dominant
estate;
(2) a covenant that does not benefit a dominant estate is unen-
forceable; and therefore
(3) if conditions change in such a way that the servitude is no
longer of substantial benefit to a dominant estate, then the servi-
tude is unenforceable.30 3
The remaining case to be considered on this subject is Cieri v.
Gorton. ° This case involved the construction of covenants provid-
ing, "These covenants may be changed in whole or in part at any
time by an instrument in writing signed by a majority of the then
owners of the lots affected thereby 30. The defendants owned
69 of 110 lots, but they constituted but two of 41 owners. The de-
fendants wished to terminate the covenants. The plaintiffs sought
an injunction preventing this action. The question for decision was:
300. - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 836 (1981).
301. Id. at -, 627 P.2d at 841.
302. For out-of-state cases on the rule, see Wolff v. Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d
802 (1955); El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach, 477 A.2d 1066 (Del. 1984).
303. NATELSON, POA, supra note 2, § 5.5.3.
304. 179 Mont. 167, 587 P.2d 14 (1978).
305. Id. at 168, 587 P.2d at 15.
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Who constituted a majority?
In covenants of this kind, a "majority" usually is interpreted
as the owners of a majority of the lots, but this is not an invariable
rule. In fact, the Cieri court declined to follow a California prece-
dent interpreting a majority as the owners of most of the lots.30
In part, the Cieri court's decision was based on differences in
wording, and on that ground the determination might well have
been correct. As it does sometimes, however, the court then offered
additional reasons for granting the injunction against the amend-
ment. Now, one lesson of the cases-at least in this area-is that
the court often commits legal error when it chooses to expound at
greater length than is strictly necessary. Cieri is a good example.
Three additional reasons proffered by the court were, first,
that the defendants constituted but a small number of lot owners;
second, that the proposed amendment would completely abolish
the covenants; and third, that the "equities of this situation, eco-
nomic and otherwise, favor the respondents." ' 7
Apparently the court was attempting to introduce into consid-
eration certain equitable factors bearing upon a petition for an in-
junction. All three are arguably proper reasons for denying injunc-
tive relief to a plaintiff who is otherwise entitled to it.30 But, here
they were listed as reasons for granting injunctive relief to a plain-
tiff who might not otherwise be entitled to it-certainly an unprec-
edented position as far as this writer is aware.
In his opinion, Justice Sheehy stated that the defendants had
pleaded economic hardship as a reason for not granting the injunc-
tion. He then discussed the plaintiffs' investments and suggested
that "the argument of economic hardship is a two-edged sword
cutting both ways. '"309
However, a characteristic of equity practice is that economic
hardship does not cut two ways in this sort of situation. When a
defendant has breached a contractual obligation or other duty, po-
tential hardship on the defendant may nevertheless induce a court
to deny the plaintiff equitable relief and thereby limit the plaintiff
to remedies at law. If, however, the defendant has not breached a
contractual obligation or other duty, the plaintiff's hardship does
306. The precedent was Diamond Bar Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d
330, 131 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1976).
307. Cieri, 179 Mont. at 172, 587 P.2d at 17.
308. It is important to note that in this context injunctive relief was specific relief.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-19-102, 27-1-402(3) (1989). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-411(2)
(1989). For oppression as a bar to relief, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-413 (1989) and DOBBS,
supra note 2, at 108. For hardship as a bar, see WALSH, supra note 2, at 481-89.
309. 179 Mont. at 172, 587 P.2d at 17.
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not justify imposition of liability on an innocent defendant.3 10 The
time has long passed, if it ever really existed, when chancellors
could treat their offices as a "roving commission to do good.
311
VI. TOWARD A NEW MONTANA JURISPRUDENCE
In the preceding pages, I have examined the substantive origi-
nal intent behind the Field Code provisions pertaining to servi-
tudes and running covenants. I have examined also the Montana
Supreme Court's divergence from that intent. In this Part, I evalu-
ate reasons for the divergence. I conclude that the most convincing
explanations support a jurisprudential observation central to the
American political system, but largely forgotten of late, and that
we ought to put that observation to work for us by repealing the
Field Code covenant statutes.
Nineteenth century codification advocates believed that codes
would render the law more stable, more predictable, more accessi-
ble, and more fair. They relied upon the judges to defer to the
legislature on matters governed by the code. This reliance may
have been reasonable in the nineteenth century, but twentieth cen-
tury jurisprudence has not been as mature; this century is more
contemptuous of limits. The result of judicial disregard for clear
statutory meaning has been that the law as applied is more unsta-
ble, unpredictable, inaccessible, and, perhaps, more unfair than it
would have been in a pure common law system. 12
Such are the costs of judicial activism. But it is not sufficient
to assail judicial activism. We also should determine why the Mon-
tana courts elected to disregard the rules of the Field Code.
One possible explanation is that the judiciary has decided that
310. This is one of those points that the law takes so much for granted that it is
difficult to obtain citation of authority on the point. But see, WALSH, supra note 2, at 309
("Where a valid contract exists which has been broken by the defendant, so that plaintiff's
right to recover damages is clear, specific relief will be given .... (emphasis added)). See
also id. at 300.
311. This might have been true before the chancellorship of Sir Thomas More in the
reign of Henry VIII, but it has not been true since then. On the change from a "conscience"
based equity to a more sophisticated jurisprudential system, see Keigwin, The Origin of
Equity: Part III, 18 GEo. L.J. 215, 233-34 (1930).
312. Of course, one could argue that the Field Code has not proved unsuccessful be-
cause the existence of statutory provisions prevented many cases from being litigated and
answered many questions otherwise unanswerable. This is a negative proposition of the kind
difficult to prove or disprove. I did, however, undertake a search of appellate cases on the
subject in Colorado, an otherwise comparable jurisdiction with a larger population. Not only
has the volume of Colorado litigation been smaller, but as a former Colorado practitioner, I
can testify that Colorado's law of running covenants, embodied exclusively in the cases, is at
least as clear and predictable as that of Montana. Thus, we return to the fact that the
present state of Montana covenant law is not at all what the codifiers had in mind.
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the Field Code has outlived its usefulness. Certainly the legislature
has supplanted most of the provisions dealing with other sub-
jects.31 3 The cases, however, do not support the explanation that
the Code covenant provisions are merely out-of-date. The judges
have never said so, never even hinted so. Virtually all Montana
cases inconsistent with the Code could have arisen in 1895 without
variation in the relevant circumstances and no changes in Montana
society have rendered the Code's covenant rules less desirable than
they were in 1895.4
A more convincing explanation for the state of code jurispru-
dence is a purely mechanical one. Professor Gibson of Oklahoma
City University points out that the Montana codifiers' decision to
adopt both the Field Code and existing common law contributed to
uncertainty and judicial usurpation. Language in a Code designed
to displace common law could not operate comfortably within an
environment of common law. 15 Moreover, the continued authority
of the common law has encouraged Montana judges and lawyers to
look first for relevant cases, even from other states, before search-
ing for applicable statutes.
Additional insight comes from Professor Fisch, formerly a
member of the faculty at the University of North Dakota, who has
suggested a partial explanation for disregard of the Code rules in
that state.1 6 He notes that outside of Louisiana, law schools in the
United States do not teach Code jurisprudence. The tool of choice
among virtually all law professors has been the case method, a
method developed in a common law jurisdiction (Massachusetts)
at a time when the only law that really mattered lay in cases from
England and from a handful of states along the Atlantic seaboard.
313. The most recent repeal is found in 1989 Mont. Laws 685 which revised the law
pertaining to trusts and trustees.
314. If anything, societal changes should have made compliance with the Code techni-
calities easier. For example, due to an increase in the number of lawyers, Montanans proba-
bly have greater access to ihexpensive legal services than they did in 1895.
315. After reviewing an earlier draft of this article, Professor Gibson wrote to me as
follows:
Nor do I see prematurity as a real problem. It seems to me that the more basic
problem is that Montana codifiers wanted to have their cake and eat it too. They
wanted a Code (with all of the attendant advantages), but they also wanted the
common law. I suppose neither California nor Montana ever understood that you
can't have both. Once, however, Montana borrowed California's incorporation/use
of the common law idea, the concept of a pure Code (which is required for most of
a code's claimed advantages) was destroyed.
Letter to the author at 2 (Jan. 23, 1989) (letter on file at the MONTANA LAW REVIEW Office).
316. Fisch, supra note 2, at 54. Professor Fisch was writing of the experience of North
and South Dakota, but his observation is equally valid for Montana. Professor Fisch is cur-
rently Isidor Loeb Professor at the University of Missouri (Columbia).
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For many years the case method dominated law teaching in
Montana as it dominated law teaching in North Dakota and almost
everywhere else. In this statutory era, the case method is now
under attack even in non-code jurisdictions. It probably was al-
ways unequal to the needs of jurisprudence in Montana. Indeed,
Professor Fisch's educational explanation is supported by the only
generalization possible about the overall quality of Montana Su-
preme Court easement and covenant opinions: When the court ap-
plies pure common law reasoning, those opinions can be coherent
and thoughtful;31 7 when the court construes the Field Code, they
can be quite the opposite. 18
James Coolidge Carter, Field's perennial antagonist on the
subject of codification, would ascribe the unsatisfactory condition
of Montana covenant law to problems inherent in any private law
codification. Carter maintained that the only proper source of pri-
vate law is the custom of the country, and that as customs change
and grow, so does private law. According to Carter, it is the duty of
the judge in each case to ascertain the relevant customs, partially
embodied in prior cases, and apply those customs to the facts
before the court. Carter would argue that the Montana Supreme
Court performs common law judging well because the justices are
practical men and Montanans: They know and understand local
customs and can apply them confidently and competently. They
have no such advantage in construing or implementing the Code.3 19
Yet the most compelling explanation for the state of the Field
Code covenant rules is not that codification was wrong per se, but
that the Code adopted was the product of a jurisdiction in many
317. Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965), and
Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983) are examples.
. The good quality of the common law reasoning is marred by the court's occasional, but
jarring, practice of forgetting later precedents while recognizing earlier ones. There are ex-
amples of this in the law of implied easements. In Graham v. Mack, 216 Mont. 165, 699 P.2d
590 (1985), the court said that the law of implied easements was relatively new to Montana.
Id. at 174, 699 P.2d at 595 (citing Thisted, 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 and Simonson v.
McDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957)). Yet Montana implied easement cases date
at least as far back as Pioneer Mining Co. v. Bannack Gold Mining Co., 60 Mont. 254, 198 P.
748 (1921). In Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d 812 (1963), the court applied the
doctrine of implied easements and cited Pioneer, but ignored the fact that it had abolished
implied easements only six years earlier in Simonson. Justice Adair, who dissented in part
in Simonson because it overruled precedent, dissented from the opposite result in Spaeth.
His reason in the latter case was unstated, but presumably was the same.
318. Simonson v. McDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957) and Reichert v. Wee-
den, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980) are examples.
319. For his views, see generally, CARTER, supra note 2. On the futility of codification,
he quotes Horace at one point without attribution: "Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque
recurret." The quotation is from Epodes 1.10.24.
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ways foreign to Montana. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, arguably the
greatest jurist of the nineteenth century, contended that a coun-
try's jurisprudence, like its language, was an extension of its cul-
ture, and that imposition of a foreign code would lead to cultural
rejection of that code.32 0 If Savigny was right, then the fundamen-
tal problem with the Field Code is not that it is a code, nor that it
is old, nor merely that it has been insufficiently taught, but that it
did not develop in Montana.
I believe that Montana's rejection of the covenant statutes is a
cultural rejection. New York, upon whose law these statutes are
based, is a state whose cultural conditions (and within that term I
include economic and social conditions) were, and remain, dramat-
ically different from those in Montana. The land covenant rules of
New York were designed, at least in part, to protect long-standing
quasi-feudal arrangements. 21 Furthermore, they reflect an envi-
ronment in which legal formalities receive much greater respect
than in Montana, in which the ratio of cost of prevention to cost
of cure is lower than in Montana, 3 3 and in which the fact patterns
that justify a finding of legal notice are different in several
respects. 24
320. For Savigny's views, see SAVIGNY, supra note 2.
321. Much New York covenant law arose out of the extensive Van Rensselaer litiga-
tion, in which the plaintiffs were representatives of an old family of poltroons protecting
vested interests such as fee simple rents. See, e.g., supra notes 42, 143 & 159. This litigation
is prominent in the Field Code annotations to the sections governing land covenants. A
useful summary of the Van Rensselaer proceedings up to 1866 appears in Tyler v. Heidorn,
46 Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
322. To one, such as I, who has practiced property law in both the East (New York)
and the West (Colorado), the differences in the degree of respect for formality are striking.
Professors Dukeminier and Krier, in the first edition of their property case book, cite two
cases illustrative of the difference. These are Shepard v. Purvine, 196 Or. 348, 248 P.2d 352
(1952), in which the Oregon Supreme Court converted an oral license into an easement, and
Henry v. Dalton, 89 R.I. 150, 151 A.2d 362 (1959), in which the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, quoting New York authority, denied relief because the plaintiff had not complied
with the statutory requirement of a writing. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 974-75
(1981). For an illustration of the Montana Supreme Court's contempt for formal require-
ments in the covenant area, see Reichert v. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618 P.2d 1216 (1980),
discussed supra Part V(D).
323. Unlike in the East, in much of the West (and, of course, there are distinctions
between Western states also), cost avoidance is perceived as expensive while cure histori-
cally has been inexpensive. In Montana, for example, the sparse and largely homogeneous
population is remarkably non-confrontational, despite a tradition of perceived individual-
ism. Title disputes are likely to be resolved without litigation. For a study of social conduct
in a setting comparable to most of Montana, see Ellickson, Of Coase & Cattle: Dispute
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
324. See discussion of notice in Part V(I). In Montana, where inspection of the physi-
cal condition of land and face-to-face negotiation are both customary and inexpensive and
where recording systems are disorganized and little understood, the courts correctly attach
greater legal consequence to the presence or absence of actual knowledge than to the docu-
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The Montana codifiers failed to sense the difficulties inherent
in importing foreign law. 25 Codification seemed attractive because
Montana had few law libraries and little developed common law.
Codification seemed to provide a shelter of certainty in a legal en-
vironment of uncertainty. But the shelter proved a mirage.
All of the principal Montana codification proponents were
Easterners without substantial Code practice experience. 26 Instead
of rushing into codification, they might have heeded the experience
of other states. All of the other Rocky Mountain states shared the
same legal conditions as Montana, but all were able to build effec-
tive legal systems without comprehensive codification. California
had codified, but careful study of that state's experience with the
Field Code between 1872 and 1895 would have revealed that a pro-
cess of Code rejection already was under way there. By 1895, there
was a significant gap between California court decisions and statu-
tory text; one example was the persistence of equitable servitudes
despite the Field Code's effort to abolish them. Indeed, only a few
years after 1895, the California legislature completed the process of
gutting the Code's more important covenant rules. 27
None of this is to say that Montana should not have borrowed
from elsewhere. Savigny himself studied the national law of Rome
so as to better understand the national law of Germany. Eclecti-
cism of juristic sources is a virtue. But newly-borrowed concepts
must be kept within common law containers, from which those
concepts can be readily returned if they fail to meet local needs.
During the early years of a state's juristic development, locking
borrowed ideas in statutory strongboxes seems most unwise.
From the unhappy results of clamping New York common law
and California interpretation on the people of Montana, we learn
anew the lesson so often forgotten: That American federalism is
the sound response, not merely to past inclination, but to present
necessity; for the component parts of these United States remain
diverse entities. One should not be misled by the fact that The
Cosby Show plays every Thursday night in Helena as well as Yon-
ments filed in the recording system.
325. Indeed, they compounded the difficulties by annotating the New York code with
ill-fitting California decisions.
326. Supra note 108.
327. As noted at various points in this article, California's abandonment of the original
Code has been effectuated by legislative amendment and judicial departure. The latter has
assumed the form of an extra-Code jurisprudence of equitable servitudes. In the realm of
tort law, the California Supreme Court has resorted to statutory demolition under the guise
of expansive construction. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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kers. This is merely appearance. The distinctions between Mon-
tana and New York, or between either of these states and most
other members of the federal union, are subtle but profound.2
These distinctions are cultural and in proportion of cultural mix;
they appear in manners, history, religion, self-image, identity, and
mode of thought. In most states (although there are differences
even here) we may use the same words; we do not always speak the
same language.2 9
Like the other social sciences, jurisprudence (and, as we have
seen, legal education also) must take full account of such differ-
ences. Jurists can, and should, look elsewhere for sources and
ideas. But Montana private law is best grown by Montana judges
and by Montana legislators, in Montana and over time.
The growth of covenant principles in this state remains con-
stricted by a statutory shell of foreign law, cracked in places but
still confining. To the extent the old Field statutes are effective
they inhibit maturation; to the extent they are cracked they are
not really law. At least in the area of servitudes and land cove-
nants, the rest of the shell needs to be pulled away, leaving a new
Montana jurisprudence free to grow.
The state legislature should respond by repealing the statutes
on servitudes and covenants running with the land. The bill re-
pealing those statutes should validate (1) all instruments drafted
under and in compliance with the old law and (2) within a statu-
tory window, all future instruments that would have been good
under the old law.
What would be the form of the new covenant jurisprudence?
The cracks in the statutory shell afford a basis for speculation.
There would be few strictures on the express creation of covenants
and servitudes. The original parties would have much freedom in
selecting the form and subject matter. Judges would be reluctant
to imply land burdens unless the words and conduct of the parties
made their presumed intent unmistakable. It would be easy to im-
328. These observations of variation among the states rests partly on the experience of
having spent considerable amounts of time in each of seven states: Colorado, Maryland,
Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah. For the conditions in New York
(most unlike those in Montana) that formed the basis for the Field codification, see COOK,
supra note 2, at 131-34 & 184-87.
329. To the centralizers and the advocates of uniformity for the sake of uniformity,
such differences are frightening or irritating. Professor Friedman, for example, employs the
phrase "maddening complexity" (along with expressions less kind) to describe the legal dif-
ferences among the states in the late 19th century. The remark is part of a larger diatribe
against local diversity contained in his treatment of the codification movement. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 2, at 351-58.
My own belief is that local diversity is invigorating and liberating.
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pose covenants expressly, but difficult to do so by implication.
Flexibility of express creation would be complemented by flex-
ibility of termination. A covenant would not bind a transferee un-
less the court found strong reason to believe that the transferee
had agreed to its terms-that the transferee purchased the land
with knowledge of the covenant or with more than merely formal
notice. Thus, in both the creation of covenants and in their sur-
vival after transfer, there would be much emphasis on effectuating
the intent of the benefited land owner and- of the owner currently
in possession of the burdened property.
A corollary to the foregoing is that a covenant would not long
survive transfer of the burdened land to an owner who had not
signified an intent to be bound. Covenants would expire quickly. In
many cases, only 20 or 30 years after a covenant's creation a land-
owner accused of a non-conforming use would prove lack of notice
(or lack of knowledge), acquiescence, waiver or changed conditions.
Covenants readily made would be covenants readily broken.
Thus may we speculate and trace pictures of what might be.
The precise forms of those pictures remain of secondary impor-
tance. Of primary importance is the following: When left to a de-
veloping common law, the rules on running covenants would be
home-grown. They would meet the needs and ideals of justice, not
of somewhere else, but of Montana.
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